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Abstract
Inefficient allocation of production across heterogeneous firms is a major source of
welfare loss, but frameworks generally ignore policies that reduce the misallocation.
We study the welfare effects of policies that target the selection of surviving firms.
As an example of such policies, we focus on product standards that force the small,
low-quality firms to exit the market. Using data from Chile, we find that more re-
strictive standards are associated with a reallocation of domestic sales from small to
large firms. Guided by this evidence, we study the welfare effects of standards in a
model with monopolistically competitive, heterogeneous firms, and a general demand
system. The standard improves welfare if low-quality firms over-produce in the market
allocation relative to the efficient allocation. We estimate our model across Chilean
industries and find that in several instances the imposed standard is too restrictive
relative to a theoretical upper bound.
Keywords: Allocative Efficiency, Product Standards, Variable Markups, Quality Het-
erogeneity.
JEL Code: L11, D6, F13.
∗We thank Maggie Chen, Thibault Fally, Robert Feenstra, Amit Khandelwal, James Lake, Yasusada Mu-
rata, Andres Rodriguez-Clare, Mathieu Parenti, Katheryn Russ, and Vladimir Tyazhelnikov for suggestions
and feedback. We thank participants at UC Berkeley, UC Davis, UC Santa Cruz, University of Tubingen,
Universite´ libre de Bruxelles-ECARES, George Washington University, Midwest International Economics
Fall Meeting 2017, Aarhus-Kiel Workshop 2017, Danish International Economic Workshop 2018, IOSE 2018,
and Moscow International Economics Workshop.
†Address: Department of Economics and Business Economics, Aarhus University, Fuglesangs Alle´ 4, 8210
Aarhus V. E-mail: lmacedoni@econ.au.dk
‡Address: Department of International Business, George Washington University. 2201 G St NO, Wash-
ington, DC 20052. E-mail: aweinberger@gwu.edu
1 Introduction
In the presence of heterogeneity in the underlying characteristics of firms, market efficiency
depends in large part on the efficient allocation of production across firms. Allocative ineffi-
cient markets can lead to losses in terms of aggregate productivity (Basu and Fernald, 2002)
and welfare (Edmond et al., 2015). The high degree of firm heterogeneity in productivity
(Bernard et al., 2007) and product appeal (Hottman et al., 2016) documented in the empiri-
cal literature implies that policies that generate a reallocation of production can have major
welfare effects (Hsieh and Klenow, 2009; Dhingra and Morrow, 2016). However, practical
policy implications are difficult to find as a way to improve upon the observed misallocation.1
As a complement to the aforementioned studies, this paper focuses on the set of policies that
targets the selection of firms into production or exit. We study the welfare effects of these
policies with a theoretical model and quantify their effects by calibrating our model using
Chilean firm-level data.
As a representative policy that directly targets the selection of firms into production or
exit, we examine regulations on goods’ characteristics, namely product standards. Standards
directly affect the selection of firms, as more restrictive product standards force the exit of
low-quality firms that are unable to comply with them. Such an exit can be rationalized by
an increase in the fixed cost of operation, as Fontagne´ et al. (2015) and Ferro et al. (2015)
documented that more restrictive standards mainly affect the number of firms selling to a
destination, rather than the sales per firm. The natural implication of these studies is that
standards reduce welfare through a reduction in competition and the number of varieties.
However, with firm heterogeneity, the subsequent reallocation of production from exiting
low-quality firms to surviving high-quality firms makes the overall welfare implications am-
biguous. We show that standards can improve welfare by reducing the distortions that arise
in allocatively inefficient markets. Such distortions originate from the interaction between
consumers’ preferences and firms’ variable market power.
We motivate our focus on product standards by documenting the effects of one particular
type of standard on the reallocation of production across firms. We use a panel data of
Chilean firms and the TRAINS database on sanitary and phythosanitary (SPS) standards
and compare the sales and survival probability of large firms relative to small ones, when SPS
standards become more restrictive in an industry. The specification controls for industry-
year shocks and time-invariant firm specific characteristics. The main result is that sales and
1In the context of international trade, Edmond et al. (2015) and Dhingra and Morrow (2016) show that
competition improves allocative efficiency. However, increased competition is the byproduct of reduction in
trade costs or increases in market size, and not the target of a specific policy. In fact, Costinot et al. (2016)
lament the dearth of analysis for optimal trade policies when firms are heterogeneous.
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survival probability of large firms, relative to small firms, are magnified in industries with
a larger number of standards. The effects of SPS standards are similar when considering
low- and high-quality firms or small and large firms. We interpret this as a reallocation of
production from low- towards high-quality/productivity firms.
To study the welfare consequences of such a reallocation, we incorporate regulations on
product standards into a closed economy framework of perfect information, monopolistic
competition, and firms that are heterogeneous in quality. There are three assumptions to
clarify from the outset. First, the closed economy framework allows us to clearly decompose
effects on domestic firms, which we believe maintains a manageable scope for this paper.2
Second, motivated by Kugler and Verhoogen (2012), we link the size heterogeneity of firms
to exogenous quality draws. Finally, we represent the imposition of regulation as a level of
quality that a government allows in the market. The latter two assumptions allow us to
present our main results in the simplest possible setting. However, we verify that our theo-
retical results hold in two important extensions that relax these two assumptions. First, we
link firm quality to exogenous productivity draws and allow the variable costs of production
to be related to quality. Second, we model the imposition of the regulation as the payment
of a fixed cost of compliance3, which affects the selection of firms, generalizing our results to
all vertical norms and not exclusively to product standards.4
Raising the standard or, equivalently, making regulations more stringent, has two op-
posing effects on welfare. First, the quality standard reduces the total number of varieties
available for consumption, as the low-quality varieties exit. In models featuring love for va-
riety (Krugman, 1980), as ours, fewer varieties reduce welfare. Furthermore, as the standard
reduces the number of competitors, it can generate anti-competitive effects, whereby welfare
is reduced as surviving high-quality firms increase their markups in response to lower com-
petition. Second, the standard causes a reallocation of production from low- to high-quality
firms, which we label the composition effect of the standard, and is consistent with our mo-
2Standards are crucial in trade policy, so we introduce trade separately in a companion paper (Macedoni
and Weinberger, 2019). We confirm that the results in this paper hold, and in fact product standards work
as a complement to lower trade barriers (please contact authors for results). Notice however that standards
are imposed on all firms in the domestic economy, so trade is not necessary as a rationale for standards.
3Complying to a regulation can increase both variable and fixed costs of production. Both costs affect the
selection of firms but, relative to the baseline model, they reallocate workers from production to compliance
tasks, which is welfare reducing. This welfare reducing effect always dominates potential welfare benefits
of regulations if only variable costs increase. As we show in this paper, such a result does not necessarily
happen if regulations affect only the fixed costs.
4Vertical norms are easily characterized as being more or less stringent, such as limits on car emissions
or on residue levels of pesticides. As a specific example, the U.S. requires prosciutto to be dry cured for 2
years. One can view this as the imposition of a fixed compliance cost that will drive out potential producers.
We ignore horizontal norms, which arise when the local firms’ differentiated good is adopted as a norm, as
electric plugs (Baldwin et al., 2000).
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tivational evidence. The composition effect of the standard improves the average quality in
a market and, thus, it raises welfare.
To provide a general framework to analyze allocative inefficiency, we choose the “Gener-
alized Translated Power” (GTP) preferences proposed by Bertoletti and Etro (2018), which
nest the most common classes of preferences used in the literature: indirectly additive (IA),
directly additive (DA), and homothetic. In this general demand system, the model predicts
a non-monotone, hump-shaped relationship between the quality standard and welfare for
all parametric specifications. At low levels of the quality standard, the composition effect
improves allocative efficiency and such an effect dominates the welfare loss from diminishing
variety and competition. Eventually the standard becomes too restrictive — above its opti-
mal level — when the welfare loss from diminishing the number of firms offsets the welfare
enhancing components of the standard.
The interaction between consumers’ preferences and firms’ variable market power impacts
the anti-competitive effect of the standard. In fact, the size of the anti-competitive effects
depends on the elasticity of a firm’s markup with respect to the number of competitors.
The three preferences included in GTP differ in the extent of anti-competitive effects, which
are absent in the IA case and are the largest under homothetic preferences. Hence, the
model predicts the most restrictive optimal standard under IA, intermediate under DA, and
the smallest under homothetic preferences. That the presence of an optimal standard holds
for the three classes of preferences is significant because the rationale for the policy is not
dependent on parametric assumptions that are difficult to test. Furthermore, comparing the
three cases provides useful intuition on the channels that are important for our result.
We clarify the mechanisms through which the standard reduces distortions by comparing
the market allocation to the socially optimal allocation. Generally, there are three margins
through which the market is inefficient: the selection of firms, the quantity produced by each
firm, and the number of firms that attempt to enter the market. We limit the analysis to the
allocation of production among entrants (the first two margins) by making an assumption
common to the literature with firm heterogeneity, that firms draw their quality from a Pareto
distribution (Chaney, 2008; Arkolakis et al., 2012, 2017).
The distortion reduced by a quality standard is known as “business stealing bias”, where
too many low-quality firms are active in a market, relative to an optimal allocation.5 In
addition, due to the markup distribution, high-quality firms under-produce and low-quality
firms over-produce, relative to an efficient allocation. A necessary condition for such a
5This intuition is present in Mankiw and Whinston (1986) and Dhingra and Morrow (2016). The business
stealing bias dominates another distortion commonly labeled “lack of appropriability”, which generates too
little production from low-quality firms, and occurs when firms cannot fully seize or appropriate the gains
from a new variety.
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misallocation is that firms charge variable markups – consumers are willing to purchase
low-quality goods provided that those markups are low enough in the laissez faire economy.
To quantify the effects of product standards, we estimate our model across 40 Chilean
manufacturing industries.6 We note that, although a standard allows for an intuitive theoret-
ical mechanism through which low-quality firms exit, in reality there can be numerous policies
that generate the same distributional effect on production. We find a significant presence
of such policies across Chilean industries. For example, in 2000, the presence of regulations
reduced the survival probability of a firm by 40% on average. The restrictiveness of regu-
lations also differs across industries: Chemicals, Motor Vehicles, Food, and Books/Journals
are consistently the most regulated industries, while Furniture and Apparel are the least
regulated. As a sanity check, we also find that simulating the model with calibrated pa-
rameters, varying only the implied estimated standards, generates distributional outcomes
consistent with those in Chile in response to changes in the number of SPS regulations.
We conduct a policy-relevant evaluation by comparing the estimated level of restrictive-
ness with a theoretical upper bound for the restrictiveness of the standard predicted by our
model. In 5 out of 38 industries in 2005, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the estimated
standard is different than the theoretical upper bound. Hence, in those five industries, the
standards are too restrictive in light of our model. Moreover, the number of industries that
are too restrictive has declined since 2000. We postulate that an increase in the relative size
of the largest firms is consistent with policymakers’ willingness to reduce restrictiveness of
standards. Such a reallocation could be the result of trade openness as Chile experienced a
boom in trade after 2000.7 Trade reduces misallocation (Edmond et al., 2015), and standards
work as a complement as they generate a similar compositional effect.
Relationship with the Literature. Our paper relates to a growing literature within the
trade, industrial organization, and macro fields, on the aggregate consequences of misallo-
cation of production across heterogeneous firms.8 In this paper, we explore the case where
a policy-maker can set a minimum level of quality that is allowed to sell in a market, and
generalize the result to the payment of a fixed cost that achieves the same allocation. Under
a plausible set of conditions – governed by the demand faced by firms – regulatory measures
can raise welfare through an increase in allocative efficiency. The extension of optimality
results in Dhingra and Morrow (2016) and Bertoletti and Etro (2018) to a framework with
6Our estimates of the implied survival restrictions in Chilean industries is similar to Behrens et al. (2018)
who use firm revenues/employment to estimate the distortions present within French industries.
7This is exemplified not only by the observed increase in trade flows, but the passage of important free
trade agreements with the United States, EU, and China.
8Quantitative evidence has been highlighted in Restuccia and Rogerson (2008), Hsieh and Klenow (2009),
Edmond et al. (2015), Behrens et al. (2018), and Weinberger (2017).
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quality differentiation, is a separate contribution of this paper.
The trade literature has highlighted that an increase in economic integration can reduce
the misallocation across firms that are heterogeneous in their productivity. International
trade forces the exit of low-productivity firms and, thus, aggregate productivity increases
(Melitz, 2003). In addition to that, trade induced pro-competitive effects can further im-
prove allocative efficiency (Dhingra and Morrow, 2016). This paper shows that a similar
reallocation can be achieved with domestic policies that force the exit of low-quality firms.
Furthermore, we show that our results generalize to a framework in which firm quality de-
pends on the underlying distribution of productivity.9 In the same vein, our paper relates
to the macro and industrial organization studies on the effect of size-dependent policies on
welfare. These studies find that government policies that protect small firms and hinder
the size of large firms have large distortionary implications (Guner et al., 2008; Garicano
et al., 2016). Interestingly, product standards have the opposite effect: by making selection
tougher and reallocating production to high-quality firms, distortions are reduced.10
An important contribution is to provide a rationale for product standards that has not
been explored in any of the previous literature. Quality standards or regulations could
be raised to address negative externalities, such as environmental externalities (Parenti,
2016; Mei, 2017), to reduce oligopolists’ market power (Baldwin et al., 2000), to enhance
investments in quality upgrading (Gaigne and Larue, 2016), or to reduce distortions due to
information frictions (Atkeson et al., 2014). Last but not least, standards could be used as
murky protectionism (Baldwin and Evenett, 2009), as studied by Fischer and Serra (2000)
in the context of an international duopoly. This paper acts as a complement to the existing
literature on rationales for regulations as it is the first to explore the role of inefficient
markets. The “quality” of the firm in our model encompasses any (single) dimension through
which quality is determined for a product, including characteristics that involve a negative
externality. However, we do not impose an ad hoc externality because the presence of quality
differentiation across firms in itself creates a distortion.
Trade policy makers have traditionally considered regulations on product standards as a
form of barriers to trade that primarily impacts the extensive margin of firms. In this vein,
studies have relied on export flows to show that exporters, and in particular the smallest
ones, from a specific origin (e.g France) are less likely to sell a product to destinations that
impose relatively more regulations in those products (Fontagne´ et al., 2015; Fernandes et
al., 2015; Ferro et al., 2015). We separate from this literature and examine the effect on
9However, our results could be generalized to policies that force low-productivity firms to exit as well.
10In the spirit of Djankov et al. (2002), there is a related literature on the anti-competitive consequences of
regulations on entry. For example, Mitton (2008) and Fisman and Allende (2010) establish that regulations
generate industry concentration.
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domestic firms instead, with a focus on the distribution of firm sales. Our approach fits with
the emphasis on firm selection and reallocation of production that are integral to gains from
trade when firms are heterogeneous and compete monopolistically (Melitz, 2003).
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the stylized facts that motivate
our focus on product standards. Section 3 describes a framework with generalized translated
power preferences and quality differentiation, where a policy maker may impose a quality
standard. Section 4 shows the results from estimating the model. Section 5 concludes.
2 Motivational Evidence
The theory in Section 3 frames regulations on product characteristics as a quality standard,
which selects out of the market the smallest firms. Our baseline model links firm size to
exogenous quality draws and hence the standard reallocates production from small, low-
quality firms to large, high-quality firms. In this section, we aim to motivate this approach
with firm-level data that allows us to observe survival and sales distributions at the finest
industry disaggregation available (4-digit ISIC). We take a balanced panel of Chilean firms
and provide evidence of a relationship between the imposition of regulations at the industry
level and a growing differential of survival and sales across small and large firms.
2.1 Data
Detailed Database of Non-Tariff Measures. In order to map our regulations to the
data, we make use of the prevalence of technical measures. Technical measures are domestic
regulations that the WTO interprets as possible barriers to market access. With the secular
decline in import tariffs, trade economists have pointed towards technical measures as an
increasingly relevant subject in trade agreements (Maskus et al., 2000; Baldwin et al., 2000).
These provide us with a useful measure of regulatory standards across industries as they are
standards imposed by the government with the aim of restricting access to both domestic
and foreign firms depending on the characteristics of their products. For example, when
Chile imposes a “zero-tolerance” on salmonella in poultry products, the stringency of their
standards must be applied equally for domestic and imported products. We view it as
reasonable to interpret the risk-factors for salmonella as part of the quality of this product,
so that this type of technical measure could eliminate potential producers of low-quality
poultry.
TRAINS has recently made available a comprehensive database of technical measures
imposed by WTO members. The database includes all domestic regulations found in official
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texts that can be classified as non-tariff measures (NTMs).11 The 2012 NTM classification
separates measures into 16 chapters (labeled A-P), and we make use of the sanitary and
phythosanitary (SPS) measures, to construct our measure of quality regulation. SPS stan-
dards – along with technical barriers to trade (TBT) – are chapters defined by UNCTAD
(2017) as “technical measures.” We believe SPS standards fit most closely with our quality
standard in the theory, although robustness results include TBT as well. These are the type
of regulations that Ferro et al. (2015) and Fontagne´ et al. (2015) have shown to primarily
reduce the extensive margin of exporters. Although Fontagne´ et al. (2015) focus on “specific
trade concerns” raised by trade partners, we use all technical measures applied by Chile.
Our empirical question differs from theirs: we want to capture the imposition of all possible
regulations on the books that act as a quality standard in a particular industry.
The technical measures apply to both imported goods and locally-produced goods and,
thus, do not discriminate between domestic and foreign firms.12 We emphasize that these
capture a broad measure of product standards and not just import barriers.
The data is available at the imposing country-product-NTM code-year level. For each
SPS regulation, the starting year, products affected, and type of standard are reported.13
We construct a frequency index at the industry ISIC(i)-year(t) level as our measure of
restrictiveness, labeled TMit, that can be merged to our domestic firm production data
(described below). To construct the frequency index, we first count the number of regulations
(unique 2-digit NTM codes) in each product-year, where products are 6-digit HS codes.
Then, we sum the total number of regulations for each 4-digit ISIC (revision 3) industry.
To control for the number of products in each industry, we divide the previous sum by the
number of HS6 products in the 4-digit industry. Table 4 in Appendix 6.2 lists the top 25
industries ranked by the restrictiveness in the 1995-2007 period, where just for this table
we sum up all measures imposed across all years. We rank these using both SPS and TBT
standards, as well as only SPS. Unsurprisingly, these rankings are populated by food and
pesticide products, along with chemicals and equipment machinery.
Chilean Firm Data. The Chilean data is a census of a panel of firms with more than
10 employees from 1995 to 2007, provided by Encuesta Nacional Industrial Annual (ENIA,
11TRAINS collects official measures imposed by countries that might affect international trade, that are
mandatory, and are currently applied. National governments or local consultants hired by the World Bank
collect regulations from official government sources, such as Customs Agencies or Government Ministries.
12To safeguard against discriminatory technical measures, in the main specification we drop NTM classi-
fication A1 within the SPS chapter (and B1 with the TBT chapter in the robustness). These are most likely
to include regulations that only affect imported goods.
13See Appendix 6.1 for a detailed description of the data and how we compute our frequency index. We
use the starting year for time variation, as we use a flow measure of standards.
7
National Industrial Survey) and collected by the National Institute of Statistics (INE). Each
firm is classified with a 4-digit ISIC industry. There are approximately 5,000 firm level
observations per year and firms are tracked across time with a unique identification number.
The census includes detailed firm data such as total sales, value/usage of its factors, etc.
2.2 Product Standards and Chilean Firms
The data described above allows us to test the distributional effects of technical measures
within industries. To do so, we run the following specification:
yfit = αit + αf + βMTMit ∗ Charf + βXXit ∗ Charf + fit, (1)
where yfit is a performance measure for firm f in industry i at year t which includes log
domestic sales and a dummy for positive sales (“survival premium”). TMit is the measure
of industry restrictiveness based on the imposition of SPS and TBT measures as reported
in Table 4. Charf is a dummy that we interpret as the firm characteristic. The goal of this
exercise is to capture reallocation across firms with a specification that identifies only the
heterogeneous effects. The indicator labels a firm as “large” or “high-quality” if it is above
the median in domestic sales and various quality proxies within its industry in 1995. Since
the firm indicator is fixed over time, and absorbed by the firm fixed effect, it is not correlated
with the error term. The main coefficient of interest is βM , which identifies the high- versus
low-quality differential response to the imposition of regulations in an industry-year.
As a proxy for the “Charf” characteristic above, we identify firms size by their domestic
sales and also rely on three input measures as proxies for quality: the firms’ capital stock,
labor costs, and intermediate input costs, each divided each by the number of employees.
Higher capital intensity, average wage per worker, and average material input costs all ar-
guably correlate with output quality given the relationship of output quality with input
quality (Fan et al., 2018).14 These have been used in previous studies, for example Hallak
and Sivadasan (2013) use the same quality proxies for Chile, although they complement these
with Indian product-level data that allows them to also use the adoption of ISO 9000 certifi-
cation and input/output prices.15 The three proxies in our paper are likely capturing similar
attributes as the more direct quality measures, although they are of course imperfect.16
14The three proxies are positively correlated with a ratio of skilled workers to unskilled workers, using a
(rough) measure in the Chilean data that labels a category of workers as unskilled (or “no calificados” in
Spanish). Not surprisingly, the correlation is strongest with the wages per worker quality proxy.
15When they investigate the exporter quality premium conditional on size, they find very similar results
across all of the quality proxies.
16Access to product price data would allow us for better proxies of quality. On a related note, we cannot
capture single vs. multi-product firms which is a concern since the regulations are on products and not on
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We include industry-year (αit) and firm (αf ) fixed effects to control for the variety of in-
dustry and macroeconomic shocks, plus time invariant firm characteristics. This restrictive
specification only captures the relative firm outcomes that are due to changes in technical
measures and not due to the various industry characteristics that might drive the firm sales
distribution.17 The time-varying controls, Xit ∗ Charf , capture changes in non-regulatory
industry characteristics that might drive relative outcomes between firms of different charac-
teristics. These include an interaction of industry openness with the firm indicator to control
for differences in competition introduced by trade, and an interaction of the firm indicator
with the level of import tariffs at the industry level.18
In our main specification, we consider a balanced panel of firms. We keep only firms
alive in 1995 and construct a balanced panel where a firm is given a survival dummy equal
to 0 if it does not sell in that year. This follows the specification in Fontagne´ et al. (2015)
and allows us to interpret the firms in the first year as the “potential” producers. Firms are
assigned an indicator (Charf ) based on being above or below the median in 1995.
19 To some
degree the results on the “survival” outcome are affected by the fact that firms with less
than 10 employees are not forced to participate to the survey. However, given that we find
exit to be more prevalent among the smallest firms and the sign on relative survival (βM) is
in the direction that we expect, the censoring of the data likely understates the magnitude
of the firm churning.
We first rely on a OLS estimation of (1). This specification controls for possible omitted
variable bias with its set of fixed effects. However, it is difficult to know the reasons behind
the imposition of standards by the government, and for this reason one might worry about
reverse causality. For example, sales dispersion may reflect Chilean consumers preference for
quality in certain industries, and the government responds by imposing standards. Panel B
of Table 1 reports an IV specification where TMit is instrumented using the TMit measure
in Peru, interacted with the same firm indicator. We use the TMit in Peru because we find
this country to be closest to Chile in terms of regulatory structure across industries (and
therefore the F-stat in the first stage is very large).
firms. First, we note that firm fixed effects control for whether an affected firm is single or multi-product (if
they are not changing across types). Second, our theoretical results can be extended to include multi-product
firms that produce varieties of different quality. A standard may force the exit not only low-quality firms,
but also of the low-quality varieties of any firm. We argue that our theoretical results are not affected since,
in the presence of a Pareto distribution of the underlying firm characteristics, aggregate variables depend
only on the extensive margin of firms. For details see Macedoni and Xu (2018).
17Our specification controls for time-varying industry characteristics, as well as time-invariant firm char-
acteristics, that are correlated with the sales distribution. For example, differences in product differentiation
and demand elasticities across firms and industries are controlled for with the fixed effects.
18As described below, import tariffs declined in this period, although mostly uniformly across industries.
19For the specification with sales as an outcome, our results are robust to using the unbalanced panel.
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Results. In order to investigate the welfare effects of product standards, our theory dif-
ferentiates firms based on the quality of the product they produce. The key limitation
data-wise, as faced by previous literature and described above, is the lack of an explicit
measure of quality. It is important to note however that connecting the empirical results
to the theory does not hinge on the ability of our proxies to capture quality uniquely. As
in Kugler and Verhoogen (2012), in our model there is a direct mapping from quality to
sales heterogeneity. Furthermore, we have extended the model to the case where firms are
heterogeneous in productivity, and the same welfare-improve reallocation is possible. There-
fore, we believe that an agnostic interpretation of the empirical analysis, where reallocation
across firms can be interpreted as either being across firm quality or firm size, is consistent
with the theoretical model. The interpretation of βM highlights this reallocation.
Table 1 reports the main motivational results using OLS (Panel A) and IV (Panel B)
estimations. The results on domestic sales suggest that the ratio of sales between small
and large firms is magnified when industries become more regulated. The coefficient in the
first row of column (1) implies that imposing one standard that affects every product in an
industry results in a 1% larger sales difference between an average large firm relative to the
average small firm (Panel A). The three proxies for quality yield similar results, although
they are the most precise when using capital intensity. In column (2), imposing a regulation
for every product in an industry results in a 1.5% difference between a firm with above-
median capital intensity relative to below-median capital intensity. Our interpretation is
that imposing new product standards in an industry generates reallocation from small to
large firms, and suggests this reallocation is also across low to high quality firms.
The last four columns in Panel A suggest that the survival of large firms relative to small
firms is also higher in more regulated industries. In this case, the standard errors increase
due to the limited variation in exit rates. Still, we find that exit rates increase significantly
for smaller firms relative to large firms as product standards increase. The higher relative
exit rates show up across the three firm indicators as well.
The coefficient on the interaction between industry tariffs and firm characteristics is
generally negative and statistically significant. In line with the empirical trade literature,
reducing tariff reallocates production from small to large firms. Industry openness has mostly
an insignificant effect on the distribution of firm sales while it reduces the difference in the
survival probability of large relative to small firms. This result might reflect the positive
effect of increased access to foreign markets on the extensive margin of firms, or it might be
correlated with the tariff measure. However, we find that eliminating the openness interaction
has no effect on our coefficient of interest (results omitted).
In the IV specification, the standard errors and coefficients are both larger, likely indicat-
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ing that the IV estimator provides an upper bound, but the qualitative results are consistent
with the OLS estimation. There is a reallocation across small and large firms as industries
as product standards increase, and this also shows up in the average wage proxy.
Table 1: Firm Sales and Survival Heterogeneity: Effect of Technical Measures
Panel A: OLS
Log Domestic Sales Survival
(Sales) (K/L) (W/L) (M/L) (Sales) (K/L) (W/L) (M/L)
TM*Char 0.010∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.009∗ 0.007 0.011∗∗ 0.008∗ 0.011 0.009∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.003)
Openness*Char 0.028 0.964 0.146 -0.262 -0.521∗∗ -0.523∗∗∗ -0.406 -0.427∗∗∗
(1.291) (0.787) (1.095) (0.827) (0.245) (0.100) (0.269) (0.185)
Tariff*Char -0.010∗∗∗ -0.011∗∗∗ -0.013∗∗∗ -0.009∗∗ -0.003∗∗ -0.008∗∗∗ 0.000 -0.002∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Fixed Effects Firm, I-Y Firm, I-Y Firm, I-Y Firm, I-Y Firm, I-Y Firm, I-Y Firm, I-Y Firm, I-Y
R2 0.955 0.955 0.955 0.955 0.644 0.645 0.644 0.644
# Observations 44220 44220 44220 44220 69679 69679 69679 69679
Panel B: IV Results
Domestic Sales Survival
(IV-Sales) (IV-K/L) (IV-W/L) (IV-M/L) (IV-Sales) (IV-K/L) (IV-W/L) (IV-M/L)
TM*Char 0.028∗∗ 0.032∗∗ 0.034∗∗ 0.003 0.022∗∗ 0.006 0.022∗∗ 0.011
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Openness*Char 0.010 0.949 0.125 -0.258 -0.526∗∗∗ -0.522∗∗∗ -0.411∗∗∗ -0.428∗∗∗
(0.716) (0.831) (0.884) (0.901) (0.117) (0.113) (0.120) (0.118)
Tariff*Char -0.011∗∗∗ -0.012∗∗∗ -0.013∗∗∗ -0.009∗∗∗ -0.004∗∗∗ -0.008∗∗∗ -0.000 -0.002∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
F-stat (first stage) 1708.0 1733.0 1718.9 1727.4 1842.3 1842.3 1842.3 1842.3
# Observations 44220 44220 44220 44220 69679 69679 69679 69679
Fixed Effects Firm, I-Y Firm, I-Y Firm, I-Y Firm, I-Y Firm, I-Y Firm, I-Y Firm, I-Y Firm, I-Y
In this table we conduct the specification displayed in (1), using technical measures imposed in Chile (top), and also instrumenting Chile’s
measures with Peru’s technical measures (bottom). To construct the frequency index of technical measures, we allow technical measure for
the SPS chapter only, but drop those geared towards imports. The NTM measures are aggregated to the 4 digit ISIC industry level. The total
number of measures in each industry-year are summed and then divided by the number of HS6 products in the industry. Each column interacts
the TM measure with a dummy for above median in 1995 in terms of sales and quality, where quality is proxied by capital per worker, total
wages per worker, and input expenditure per worker respectively. For the results on survival, all firms alive in 1995 are “potential” producers
in all years, which is why the number of observations is much larger. In all specifications we include an interaction of industry openness with
the quality indicator, an interaction of the quality indicator measure with the industry import tariff, plus firm and industry-year interacted
fixed effects. Standard errors – clustered by 4-digit industry – are in parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
In the appendix, we show that there is a strong correlation in the data between all the
quality proxies and firm sales, which allows us to interpret a quality standard as essen-
tially eliminating firms in the left tail of the sales distribution. Furthermore, we document
a strong relationship between all the quality proxies and a measure of TFP. This result is
important because our theoretical implications with quality heterogeneity can be translated
11
to productivity heterogeneity. These relationships are also consistent with Hottman et al.
(2016), which find that product “appeal” is the most important component of sales hetero-
geneity. In summary, the empirical findings motivate our theoretical framework, with firms
differentiated by quality, and a standard that eliminates the lowest quality firms.
Next, we briefly describe several robustness results to the above empirical specification
that are reported in Appendix 6.2.
Robustness. The NTM dataset may contain both vertical and horizontal norms, although
our theoretical framework only considers vertical norms. As a way to deal with this issue,
in the baseline results we use only SPS. In Table 6 in the Appendix we replace the set
of technical measures used in specification (1) with a more general definition, using TBT
measures as well. Either type of technical measure could be associated with a widening of
sales dispersion and lower survival for low-quality firms. The results are almost identical,
which suggests that neither SPS or TBT are driven by horizontal norms, although they are
arguably more likely to come in technical regulations under TBT.20
A common issue with data on regulations is the high level of measurement error. For
instance, there could be a mismatch between the date of initial enforcement of a regulation,
and the date of its listing in the dataset. To address the concern, we run a specification
where regulations are aggregated across all years so that there is one restrictiveness measure
for each industry. In this case, the specification is a repeated cross-section, with sales as the
outcome within industry-year, and ran on an unbalanced panel. The main drawback in this
case is that we cannot control for firm fixed effects. Since the regulations are aggregated
from the HS 6 product level, firms within the same 4-digit ISIC might actually be exposed
to different levels of regulation. We add an interaction with industry trade elasticities (from
Broda and Weinstein (2006)) to control for the effect of demand characteristics on the sales
distribution – which was controlled for in the previous specification by firm fixed effects.
We find that more regulated industries exhibit higher skewness in sales towards high-quality
firms, which suggests that the possible mismatch between date of enforcement and listing of
the regulation does not drive the results (Table 7).21
The results rely on the implicit assumption that technical measures are non-discriminatory.
In fact, regulations must fit this criteria to be legal under WTO rules, and we attempt to
omit technical measures that might be more heavily weighted towards importers. To test this
20The presence of measures based on horizontal norms likely biases our results towards zero. These
measures do not discriminate on any attributes related to quality, which means that “treated” industries
will receive no distributional impact.
21On a related note, we checked whether the results are robust to a balanced panel with a different start
date, e.g. 1998, and the coefficients are very similar (results available upon request).
12
assumption, we create our TM variable using only a subset of technical measures dropped
from the main analysis that might be aimed at importers – those classified by UNCTAD
as “Prohibitions/restrictions of imports for SPS reasons” and “Prohibitions/restrictions of
imports for objectives set out in the TBT agreement”, and “Pre-Shipment Inspections”.
Since these are the measures least likely to affect domestic firms, we expect to not find the
same type of evidence for reallocation. In fact, we find the opposite result of our baseline
specification: in 7 of the 8 interactions the coefficients are negative (Table 8). We caution
however that these results have large standard errors as there are few technical measures
that fit this definition.22
3 Theory
This section builds a theory for the welfare effects of standards. We begin by presenting the
description of the environment, with a standard supply side and a general demand system
that nests several preferences common in the literature. Then, we proceed by allowing a
policy maker the option of imposing a quality standard, whose effects on the distribution
of firms are consistent with the evidence documented in the previous section. We derive
an expression for welfare as a function of the standard, and find that a standard more
restrictive than the market allocation is always optimal. We discuss the sources of market
distortions that a minimum quality standard reduces, and identify the features of each type
of preferences that cause shifts in the magnitude of the optimal standard in an economy.
Given the generality of this demand system, our welfare results provide a strong motivation
for the rationale of a quality standard or other policies that target the selection of firms.
3.1 Framework
Consider a closed economy, where L consumers enjoy the consumption of varieties of a
differentiated good. We normalize per capita income to 1. The varieties are produced by a
mass of single-product firms, which differ in terms of their quality z. We assume that quality
z is a demand shifter: consumers exhibit a higher willingness to pay for higher quality goods.
There is perfect information: consumers, firms, and the government costlessly distinguish
between the quality offered in the market.23
22One coefficient is positive and large (though insignificant), but overall the results do not point to the
same reallocation effects present with the other measures.
23Papers on regulations often introduce an ad hoc externality, usually pollution or public health, to justify
the imposition of a standard (Parenti, 2016; Mei, 2017). In this spirit, we can also think of our quality measure
as a proxy for how healthy a product is. Despite consumers knowing and appreciating the healthiness of a
good, our model features a market allocation that generates over-production of unhealthy products.
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As in the Melitz (2003) model, there is a pool of potential entrants. Upon entry, firms
pay a fixed cost of entry fE in labor units and discover their quality z. Quality is drawn
from an unbounded Pareto distribution with shape parameter κ and shift parameter b. The
CDF of the distribution is H(z) = 1− ( b
z
)κ
, while the pdf is h(z) = κb
κ
zκ+1
. Only a mass J of
firms pays the fixed cost of entry. Free entry drives expected profits equal to fE.
The market is monopolistically competitive. All firms produce their goods with the
same marginal cost of production c, in labor units. These assumptions imply that size
heterogeneity is linked to the exogenous quality draws. The direct mapping of quality to size
might seem stark, but it is a convenient feature that is also present in Kugler and Verhoogen
(2012) and finds quantitative support in the empirical findings of Hottman et al. (2016).
Our results also generalize to a framework with productivity heterogeneity in which high-
productivity firms are able to produce high-quality goods, and marginal costs depend on
product quality as in Manova and Zhang (2017) (see Appendix 6.3.5).24
3.2 Consumer and Firm Problems
3.2.1 Consumer Problem
We adopt the Generalized Translated Power (GTP) preferences proposed by Bertoletti and
Etro (2018):
U =
∫
Ω
(
az(ω)ξq(ω))− (ξq(ω))
1+ 1
γ
1 + 1
γ
)
dω +
ξ−η − 1
η
(2)
where a > 0 and γ ≥ 0 are constants, q(ω) is the quantity consumed of variety ω, z(ω) is
a variety specific demand shifter, which we interpret as quality, and Ω is the set of varieties
available for consumption. ξ is a quantity aggregator that is implicitly defined as:
ξ−η =
∫ (
az(ω)ξq(ω)− (ξq(ω))1+ 1γ
)
dω (3)
The GTP utility follows the generalized Gorman-Pollak demand system25, and nests several
preferences based on the value of the parameter η ∈ [−1,∞]. For η = −1, preferences are
indirectly additive (IA) as described by (Bertoletti et al., 2018). For η = 0, preferences
become homothetic with a single aggregator. For η → ∞, preferences become directly
additive (DA), and generalize the preferences used by Melitz and Ottaviano (2008).26 Fally
24Feenstra and Romalis (2014) provide the microfoundation for such an assumption. Our results would
also hold in a standard framework with productivity heterogeneity.
25Gorman (1972), Pollack (1972).
26The case where γ = 1 generates linear demand as in the separable case of Melitz and Ottaviano (2008).
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(2018) describes the regularity conditions for these preferences.27
The consumer’s budget constraint is:∫
Ω
p(ω)q(ω)dz ≤ 1
where p(ω) is the price of variety ω and per capita income is normalized to 1. The consumer
chooses q(ω), ω ∈ Ω, to maximize its utility subject to the budget constraint. Consumer’s
inverse demand is:
p(ω) = ξ1+η
[
az(ω)− (ξq(ω)) 1γ
]
(4)
3.2.2 Firm Problem
Given the quality draw z, a firm maximizes its profits by choosing quantity q(z) taking ξ as
given. Profits are given by:
pi(z) = Lξ1+η
[
azq(z)− ξ 1γ (q(z))1+ 1γ
]
− Lcq(z) (5)
The first order condition with respect to q(ω) equals:
ξ1+η
[
az −
(
1 +
1
γ
)
(ξq(z))
1
γ
]
= c
and setting q(z∗) = 0 yields the market determined quality cutoff:
z∗ =
c
a
ξ−(1+η) (6)
For a quality level below the cutoff z < z∗, a firm has zero demand.28 The relationship
between the cutoff and η will be key in comparing our results across the types of preferences
because the demand faced by each firm is governed by the firms’ quality relative to the market
cutoff. The quality cutoff in the IA case (η = −1) only depends on income (normalized
to one): z∗IA =
c
a
. The cutoff for homothetic preferences (η = 0) depends only on the
number of competitors and is independent of income: z∗H =
c
a
ξ−1. In the DA case, the
27In Web Appendices we make available interesting non-GTP cases such as CES demand with a variety
externality, and several variable elasticity demand systems (e.g. Simonovska (2015)).
28In terms of cutoff (6) our model is isomorphic to one with productivity heterogeneity. In fact, hetero-
geneity in c or z generate the same vertical shift of the marginal cost curve or the marginal revenue curve. To
generate a model with quality heterogeneity that is fully isomorphic to one with productivity heterogeneity,
the utility function should be written as: U =
∫
Ω
(
az(ω)ξq(ω))− z(ω)(ξq(ω))
1+ 1
γ
1+ 1γ
)
dω + ξ
−η−1
η . With these
preferences, the results of our paper would still hold, but it would be more difficult for the model to match
the distribution of sales for the largest firms.
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market determined cutoff depends on both income and the number of competitors. Given
the relationship between ξ and the marginal utility of income λ29, for η →∞, z∗DA = λca .
Substituting the cutoff (6) into the first order condition yields the optimal quantity:
q(z) =
(
aγ
1 + γ
)γ
(z∗)γ
ξ
( z
z∗
− 1
)γ
(7)
As q(z) is increasing in z, active firms with higher quality sell larger quantities of their
products. Substituting (7) into (4) yields the optimal pricing rule:
p(z) = c
1
1 + γ
( z
z∗
+ γ
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Markup
(8)
Markups are increasing in z: higher quality firms charge higher prices. Such prediction
receives empirical support from Bastos and Silva (2010), Martin (2012), Dingel (2015), and
Manova and Zhang (2017).
Firm z revenues r(z) and profits pi(z) are given by:
r(z) =
Lc
1 + γ
(
aγ
1 + γ
)γ
(z∗)γ
ξ
( z
z∗
− 1
)γ ( z
z∗
+ γ
)
(9)
pi(z) =
Lc
1 + γ
(
aγ
1 + γ
)γ
(z∗)γ
ξ
( z
z∗
− 1
)1+γ
(10)
3.3 Quality Standard and Welfare
The government of the closed economy sets a minimum quality standard z¯ ≥ z∗, such that
a firm with quality z < z¯ is not allowed to sell in the economy. The quality standard is a
vertical norm (Baldwin et al., 2000): z¯ can be easily interpreted as more or less restrictive.
Since firms’ quality is exogenously determined, the policy only affects the selection of firms
into the domestic market. In particular, the larger z¯ becomes, the more low-quality firms
are forced out of the market. The model is consistent with the evidence of Section 2.
Our results generalize to all vertical norms that require the payment of a fixed cost
of compliance by all firms. This is an important generalization because it allows for a
separate way to impose the standard: a policy-maker can impose a fixed production cost
that generates the same exit of low-quality firms as z¯. In appendix 6.3.4, we investigate the
case where the standard is imposed as a fixed cost, which merely generates a downward shift
in the level of the optimal standard. We choose to model z¯ as a direct policy tool because,
29λ = 1y
∫ (
azξq(ω)− (ξq(ω))1+ 1γ
)
dω = ξ
−η
y , where λ is the multiplier on the resource constraint.
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in Section 4, we will be able to estimate its restrictiveness regardless of the level of the fixed
cost. We abstract from any costs associated with enforcing the standard by the government,
which would be hard to quantify, and would reduce the welfare benefits of standards. If the
standard or other policies only increase the marginal cost of production c, their welfare effect
would be unambiguously negative.
We abstract from firms paying a fixed cost to improve their quality a` la Gaigne and
Larue (2016) because such an assumption would not generate any additional sources of
distortions.30 Furthermore, in the presence of quality upgrading there would be a set of
low-quality firms selling products with a quality equal to the standard. Raising the standard
would raise the quality of the smallest surviving firms to the new level of the standard,
which would raise their revenues and thus reduce the sales difference between high-quality
and low-quality firms, contrary to the evidence of Section 2.
It is convenient to write our variables as a function of g = z¯
z∗ ∈ [1,∞), a measure of
the restrictiveness of the quality standard. If g = 1, the standard is ineffective: the market-
determined quality cutoff z∗ is equal to the minimum allowed z¯. For g > 1, the government
is enforcing a higher quality standard than the one determined by the market. The measure
g is related to the probability of a firm being active under the restriction, relative to the
same probability without the restriction: P (z≥g¯|g>1)
P (z≥g¯|g=1) = g
−κ.
3.3.1 Market Aggregates
We start with the market aggregates necessary to compute welfare. Details on the derivations
are relegated to the appendix. The equilibrium quality cutoff z∗ can be represented as a
function of the restrictiveness of the standard g and parameters:
z∗ =
[
Lc
η
1+η γγbκaγ+
1
1+η
fE(1 + γ)1+γ
g−κG1(g)
] 1
κ−γ− 11+η
(11)
where g−κG1(g) is decreasing in g.31 The parameter η controls the elasticity of the quality
cutoff with respect to market size L and marginal costs c. In particular, the elasticity of the
cutoff with respect to size is ∂ ln z
∗
∂ lnL
= 1
κ−γ− 1
1+η
. An increase in market size induces selection
effects, namely it increases the minimum level of quality allowed by the market, if such an
elasticity is positive. Such a condition is satisfied for homothetic (η = 0) and DA preferences
30Gaigne and Larue (2016) find that in such framework, a standard can improve welfare only under unusual
parametrical assumptions.
31G1(g) = κg
1+γ
[
F1(g)
κ−γ−1 − g−1 F2(g)κ−γ
]
. F1(g) = 2F1
[
κ− γ − 1,−γ;κ− γ, g−1] and F2(g) =
2F1
[
κ− γ,−γ;κ− γ + 1, g−1], where 2F1[a, b; c, d] is the hypergeometric function. We restrict the parameter
space such that κ− γ − 1 > 0.
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(η = ∞). However, under IA preferences (η = −1), where the cutoff is only dependent on
income, there are no selection effects due to market size.32
Substituting (11) into (6) yields the aggregator ξ:
ξ =
[
Lbκaκγγ
fE(1 + γ)1+γcκ−γ−1
g−κG1(g)
]− 1
(1+η)(κ−γ)−1
(12)
which equals one under DA preferences, decreases in g under IA preferences, and increases
in g under homothetic preferences. The aggregator ξ is a quantity shifter that affects the
volumes of production, along with z∗, of all surviving firms. Hence, the quality standard
has a partial negative effect on the volumes produced under IA preferences, and a partial
positive effect under homothetic preferences.
Finally, the mass of entrants J is independent of η:
J =
L
fE
G1(g)
G2(g)
(13)
and is increasing in the restrictiveness of the standard.33 As an increase in g increases the
average profits in the economy, more firms enter. However, the total number of active firms
in the economy N = P (z > z¯)J is declining in the restrictiveness of the standard.
3.3.2 Welfare
We are now ready to express welfare as a function of the quality standard. After integrating
over the two terms in (2) (see appendix), the utility becomes:
U =
az∗ξ
c
[
(1 + γ)
G3(g)
G2(g)
− γ
2
1 + γ
G1(g)
G2(g)
+
1
η
]
− 1
η
(14)
The term (1 + γ)G3(g)
G2(g)
− γ2
1+γ
G1(g)
G2(g)
, which is a component of the average utility, is always
increasing in g.34 On the other hand, the product of the quality cutoff z∗ and the aggregator
ξ is declining in g. Using the cutoff condition (6) and the equilibrium value of ξ (12) yields
32The elasticity of the cutoff with respect to marginal costs c, similar to the income effects of Bertoletti and
Etro (2018), is ∂ ln z
∗
∂ ln c =
η
(1+η)(κ−γ)−1 .
∂ ln z∗
∂ ln c = 0 for homothetic preferences, as in Melitz (2003),
∂ ln z∗
∂ ln c = 1
for IA preferences (η = −1), and ∂ ln z∗∂ ln c = 1κ−γ < 1 for DA preferences.
33 G2(g) = κg
1+γ
[
F1(g)
κ−γ−1 + γg
−1 F2(g)
κ−γ
]
34G3(g) = κg
1+γ
[
F1(g)
κ−γ−1
]
. Notice that, as U declines in c, policies that would only increase the marginal
cost of production c would be welfare reducing.
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the utility of consumers as a function of g:
U =
[
Lbκaκγγg−κG1(g)
fE(1 + γ)1+γcκ−γ−1
] η
(1+η)(κ−γ)−1
[
(1 + γ)
G3(g)
G2(g)
− γ
2
1 + γ
G1(g)
G2(g)
+
1
η
]
− 1
η
(15)
As shown in Figure 1, a minimum quality standard can improve welfare across the three
preferences nested into GTP. In fact, the relationship between welfare and the standard is
hump-shaped. There are two opposing welfare effects that generate such a relationship. First,
in the presence of a quality standard, the selection of firms is determined by the government
imposed z¯, and not by the market cutoff z∗. We call this the composition effect of the
standard: regardless of the preferences, the exit of low-quality firms reallocates production
towards the surviving high-quality firms. Such a reallocation is welfare improving.
Second, the quality standard reduces the number of varieties available for consumption,
which is welfare reducing under the assumption of love for variety. Furthermore, the reduc-
tion in the number of varieties may cause a change in the markups of surviving firms, through
a change in z∗ (8). The effects of the standard on markups of surviving firms depend on the
preferences used and, in particular, on the elasticity of the market cutoff with respect to L.
Under IA preferences, in which such an elasticity is zero, the standard leaves the markups of
surviving firms unchanged. Under DA and homothetic preferences, the standard increases
the markups of surviving firms. We call this the anti-competitive effect of the standard: it
operates under homothetic and DA preferences, but is silent under IA preferences. Finally,
the increase in markups, or anti-competitive effect, is largest under homothetic preferences.35
For “small” levels of restrictiveness, the composition effect dominates the reduction in
the number of varieties and the anti-competitive effects. Increasing the standard over its
optimal value causes the variety reduction to dominate, and welfare starts falling.
The optimal level of the measure of the restrictiveness of the standard gopt(κ, γ, η) only
depends on the parameters κ, γ, and η. The optimal level of the standard z¯opt is then
proportional to the market-determined cutoff:
z¯opt = gopt(κ, γ, η)z∗ (16)
If we interpret z∗ as a market determined preference for quality, markets with higher prefer-
ence for quality have higher optimal quality standards while markets with a lower preference
for quality have a lower optimal level of z¯. To derive some quantitative intuition for the
result, let us focus on the IA case, in which z∗ is a constant. For κ = 5 and γ = 1, welfare
35In fact, one can relate this result to Arkolakis et al. (2017), who show that the effect of trade costs on
the choke price can be ranked across the same types of preferences.
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Figure 1: Minimum Quality Standard and Welfare
is maximized at g = 1.41: the government sets a standard which reduces the probability of
a firm being active by |1.41−5 − 1| = 82% relative to the market allocation.36
3.4 Discussion
The most direct way to interpret how the quality standard alters welfare is through the
two channels described above. A higher standard lowers the number of varieties available,
which lowers welfare, but it raises allocative efficiency. The latter channel raises the measure
of average markups in the market allocation closer to the average social markups. That
misallocation is reduced when average markups increase might seem counter-intuitive, but
in fact allocative efficiency increases as market share is reallocated away from low-quality
firms and to high-quality firms, a channel highlighted with productivity heterogeneity in
recent work by Edmond et al. (2018), Baqaee and Farhi (2017), and Weinberger (2017).
Since a quality standard z¯ can improve welfare because the market allocation is inef-
ficient, the rest of the subsection is devoted to understand in detail which distortions are
reduced by a standard, and how these differ across the types of preferences. There are three
possible margins through which the market equilibrium is inefficient: entry, selection, and
36Under homothetic and DA preferences, z∗ is a function of z¯. Hence, the reduction in the probability of
being active becomes |(g˜)−κ − 1|, where g˜ = z¯z∗(1) = g
[
g−κG1(g)
G1(1)
] 1
κ−γ− 1
1+η . We can prove analytically that
g > 1 improves welfare under the assumption of linear demand (γ = 1). Details are available upon request.
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the distribution of markups across active firms. However, the assumption of Pareto dis-
tributed quality and monopolistic competition constrains the margins of inefficiency present
in our model to the allocation of production across entrants (the latter two).37
To understand these two margins, we recap the two biases identified in Dhingra and
Morrow (2016) (DM). The first type of distortion is due to lack of appropriability: in making
their production decision, firms do not take into account the social gains from an increase
in variety. Letting z∗P denote the optimal cutoff chosen by a planner, this “appropriation
bias” causes an excessive degree of firms’ selection, whereby z∗ > z∗P all else equal. Firm
heterogeneity in market power generates the second distortion: in making their production
decision, firms do not take into account how their choice alters production and prices of
other firms. This “business stealing” effect (DM and Mankiw and Whinston (1986)) reduces
selection below the optimum, i.e. z∗ < z∗P, because it allows low-quality firms to steal
business from high-quality firms.38 Moreover, the business stealing bias distorts the quantity
of production across firms. High-quality firms under-produce as their markups are too high
and low-quality firms over-produce, relative to the efficient allocation.
The quality standard affects welfare in two opposing directions in (15), both of which can
be understood through its effect on markups. First, the standard raises the average markup
through a composition effect which works purely through a reallocation of market shares and
bring the economy closer to the socially optimal average markup.39 The standard eliminates
low-quality firms, reducing the distortion that affects selection, and furthermore causes a
reallocation of production towards high-quality firms, therefore reducing the distortion on
the distribution of quantities produced. These are the two inefficiency margins discussed
above. Second, the standard reduces the number of varieties. Such a reduction, which is
welfare reducing in and of itself, can lead to anti-competitive results. As discussed above,
the standard can reduce competition and thus raises the markup of each surviving firm. For
small values of g, the composition effect dominates for any η.40
In the following paragraphs, we describe these market inefficiencies that emerge for each
of the three specific cases of GTP preferences. To do so, we compare the main variables of
interest between the social planner’s allocation and the market’s allocation. Details of the
planner’s allocation are in the Web Appendix.
37The mass of entrants J is always efficient in the market allocation (Arkolakis et al., 2017).
38The Dhingra and Morrow (2016) results are in fact applicable to our framework with firms differentiated
in quality instead of productivity.
39The social planner chooses to equalize markups across firms at m = κ−γκ−γ−1 .
40We note, the quality standard is not first-best. It raises expected profits, which induces too much entry,
and cannot bring the economy to the efficient allocation.
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IA Preferences. Under IA preferences (η = −1), the market allocation always generates a
business stealing bias. The ratio of the planner’s quality cutoff relative to the market cutoff is
always greater than one:
(
z∗P
z∗(1)
)
IA
= κ−γ
κ−γ−1 > 1. As a result, low-quality firms over-produce
and high-quality firms under-produce relative to the planner’s allocation. The composition
effect of the standard reduces the business stealing bias, by forcing the exit of low-quality
firms and increasing the production of surviving firms. Although the anti-competitive effect
is absent, the average markup in the economy increases because of the composition effect.
DA Preferences. Under DA preferences (η →∞), the market allocation generates busi-
ness stealing bias, provided that γ > 0 and, thus, demand is not fully rigid. The ratio of the
planner’s cutoff to the market cutoff is
(
z∗P
z∗(1)
)
DA
=
(
1 + 1
γ
) γ
κ−γ ≥ 1. For γ > 0, a quality
standard improves welfare, by reducing the business stealing bias. For γ = 0, the bias disap-
pears and the standard cannot improve welfare. The main difference relative to the IA case
is that a standard has anti-competitive effect under DA preferences: as the standard reduces
the number of firms in the market, the lower competitive pressure allows for surviving firms
to charge higher markups, limiting the benefits of the standard.
Homothetic Preferences. Under homothetic preferences (η = 0), the ratio of the plan-
ner’s cutoff relative to the market cutoff is
(
z∗P
z∗(1)
)
H
=
(
1 + 1
γ
) γ
κ−γ−1
(
1− 1
κ−γ
) 1
κ−γ−1
, and
it could be smaller or greater than one depending on the parameters of the model.41 If the
ratio is greater than one, the effects of a standard are qualitatively similar to the DA case.
In the presence of a dominating appropriation bias, a quality standard can still improve
welfare, although by a somewhat smaller magnitude relative to the case in which there is too
little selection. The reason for this seemingly surprising result is that the market allocation
generates a markup distribution that is different from the constant markup that a planner
would choose. In particular, markups are on average too small in the market relative to
the planner’s allocation. The quality standard improves upon such misallocation, despite
exacerbating the already too high level of selection. Therefore, one important conclusion
from our analysis is that the market distortions are driven entirely by the presence of variable
markups, and exist in both homothetic and non-homothetic preferences.
41The business stealing bias dominates, if κ > γ+
(
1−
(
1 + 1γ
)−γ)−1
. Since regularity conditions imply
that κ > γ + 1, there is a region for small enough κ, in which appropriation bias dominates. For instance,
for the linear case γ = 1, there is too much selection if κ ∈ (2, 3). Such a case is not quantitatively relevant:
in the empirical section we verified that it only occurs in one industry.
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Figure 2: Optimal g Across Preferences
(a) As a function of γ (b) As a function of κ
Optimal Standard Across Preferences. Figure 2 shows a ranking of the optimal degree
of restrictiveness of the standard g across preferences. In particular, goptIA > g
opt
DA > g
opt
H . The
ranking follows the extent of the anti-competitive effects of the standard, which depends on
the elasticity of the market cutoff with respect to market size ∂ ln z
∗
∂ lnL
. Under IA preferences,
such an elasticity is zero and the anti-competitive effect are absent. Thus, the optimal stan-
dard is the most restrictive. Under DA and homothetic preferences, the reduction in the
number of firms generate increases in markups. Such increases are the largest under homoth-
etic preferences. Hence, the optimal standard is the smallest under homothetic preferences,
and it is at an intermediate level under DA preferences.42
4 Model Estimation
In the theoretical framework, we incorporate regulations that affect firm selection into an
economy with firm heterogeneity, so that the measure of producing firms and the sales of
these firms depend on the level of regulatory restrictiveness in the industry plus demand
and supply parameters. Next, we use the model to estimate the regulatory restrictiveness
of Chilean industries by matching the empirical sales distribution constructed with the firm
data described in Section 2. Instead of relying on the SPS data, we employ a simulated
method of moments (SMM) procedure that estimates (g, κ, γ) to minimize the difference
42The ranking of optimal g as a function of the degree by which markups depend on the number of
competitors is respected across other preferences not included in GTP. In the online appendix, we provide a
detailed discussion of the (IA) addilog preferences (Bertoletti et al., 2018), (DA) Stone-Geary (Simonovska,
2015), and (homothetic) Quadratic Mean of Order R (Feenstra, 2018). Finally, we explore the effects of
variety externality in the Benassy-CES preferences (Benassy, 1996)
23
between percentiles of the model and data sales distribution. We avoid using our data on SPS
standards for two reasons. First, as noted in section 2, our dataset may include both vertical
and horizontal norms, and it only provides the number of regulations and no information
on their level of restrictiveness. Second, our algorithm captures the restrictiveness of any
regulation that affects selection, consistent with our general theoretical results.43
We run this procedure for a cross-section of industries and repeat it across multiple years.
The estimation yields not only an implied level of restrictiveness – which we call g in the
model – but also the optimal level of restrictiveness at the industry level given the supply and
demand parameters. Hence, we provide a meaningful interpretation of how many industries
appear to be too restrictive as characterized by the structure of the model, even allowing for
large optimal standards.
4.1 Strategy
Our goal is to estimate the parameter set (g, κ, γ) for each industry, as these are enough to
characterize the “restrictiveness” of an industry as given by g/gopt. We solve the model via
simulation because the moments in the model that pin down these parameters are created
using simulated firms. In other words, for a guess of the parameters, we simulate firm-level
outcomes and attempt to reproduce moments from the empirical domestic sales distribution.
First, we simulate a large enough number of draws so as to best approximate the entire
continuum of firms that exist in the model. We follow the insights of Eaton et al. (2011) and
relabel firm-level indicators that can be simulated from a parameter-free uniform distribution.
Recall that the pdf of the quality distribution is given by h(z) = κb
κ
zκ+1
. We draw 500,000
realizations of the uniform distribution on the [0; 1] domain, U ∼ [0; 1], we order them in
increasing order, and find the maximum realization, denoted by umax. Then, the firm quality
indicator is z = (u/umax)
−1/κ z∗. Given that the market quality cutoff (z∗) is a constant in
the IA case, we normalize this to one. By construction, z ∈ [1,∞], and hence all draws have
positive demand in the case where there is no government imposed quality standard. Given
that there exists restrictions on the survival of low-quality firms, the set of producing firms
is chosen from z ∈ [g,∞].
We adopt an over-identification strategy that targets 99 moments from the empirical
domestic sales distribution. Given a set of potential producers in the simulation, namely
those with z > g, we compute firm revenues normalized by mean revenues:
r˜(z|z > g) = r
r¯
= (G2(g))
−1
( z
z∗
− 1
)γ ( z
z∗
+ γ
)
(17)
43Below, we report an exercise that confirms that the model generates similar results as in the data if we
run specification 1 on simulated firms.
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where G2(g) is a function that depends on the targeted parameters and is described in
footnote 33. After conditioning on active firms, relative sales are independent of η.44
The theoretical relative sales are matched to their counterpart in the data in order to
identify the model parameters in an approach that follows Sager and Timoshenko (2017).
Let Fmq (g, κ, γ) = log(r˜)q be the q-th quantile of the simulated log domestic sales distribu-
tion. Then, let F dq denote the corresponding value of the empirical CDF of the log sales
distribution. Our identification consists of choosing the parameter set that minimizes the
sum of the squared errors between empirical and theoretical quantiles:
min
g,κ,γ
99∑
q=1
(
F dq − Fmq (g, κ, γ)
)2
. (18)
Finally, we compute bootstrap standard errors by running the estimation above 100 times,
each time taking a bootstrap sample of the data. We take the average parameter estimates
(gˆ, κˆ, γˆ), and use the standard deviation of estimates to compute a 95% confidence interval.
We employ the strategy above for each 4-digit ISIC (revision 3) industry by year. Although
there are about 100 industries in this level of classification, we only keep those with at least
35 firms in 1995, which allows us to estimate restrictiveness for 40 industries.
The strategy to estimate the parameter set (gˆ, κˆ, γˆ) is based on the separate ways that
each parameter is identified within the sales distribution. κ governs the shape of the quality
distribution, which is proportional to the shape in the sales distribution only in special cases
(Mrazova et al., 2017), which do not apply to our GTP specification. The divergence in
the sales and quality distribution is due to the distribution of markups. Since firm markup
levels are a function of γ (see (8)), this parameter affects the mapping from the quality to the
sales distribution and is not collinear with κ.45 Finally, as is argued above, the standard not
only eliminates low-quality firms but reallocates resources to higher-quality firms. Therefore,
relative sales across percentiles of the sales distribution are a function of g. For this reason,
we use a general strategy to match sales across the firm distribution, with each parameter
being identified by different parts of the distribution.
44In general, z∗ depends on η (11). In the non-IA cases, we compute the new z∗ for any given guess of the
standard. The predicted optimal standard depends on η, and for this reason in the appendix we compare
the results between the IA and DA cases (see footnote 36). The estimated parameters across the types of
preferences are almost identical. We implicitly ignore cross-industry interactions, as it would be the case if
consumer’s utility was a Cobb-Douglas aggregation of the industry specific utility shown in (2). Furthermore,
our algorithm does not require the estimation of the mass of entrants per industry.
45As is not the case, for example, if preferences were CES and the distribution of quality is Pareto.
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4.2 Estimation Results
For expositional purposes, we employ the procedure outlined in the previous section to
estimate (gˆ, κˆ, γˆ) for the universe of Chilean manufacturing firms in each year. The estimated
level of the quality standard gˆ had a 95% confidence interval above one in every year, with
the standard peaking at 1.13 (with standard error of .01) through 1998-2000, before dropping
every year thereafter to 1.02 in 2007 (standard error .002).
Panel A of Table 2 displays the results for the parameter estimates in 1995, 2000, and
2005. In Panel B, we report the data value and the simulated value for 5 moments that
are indirectly targeted.46 The parameter for demand curvature γˆ ranges between 1.3 and
2.4, rejecting the simple linear demand model in every year. The Pareto shape parameter of
the quality distribution κˆ varies between 4-5 for the majority of the sample (consistent with
estimates in Jung et al. (2019) and Simonovska and Waugh (2014)), and below 3 after 2004.
It is evident that we can match moments from the sales distribution closely. Finally, the
model implied average markups are 14%, 12%, and 31% in the three displayed years. These
are very much in line with the empirical average markup estimates, which are not targeted
in the estimation.47
The empirical sales distribution exhibits structural changes captured by the variation of
κˆ and γˆ over time. Although κˆ is roughly constant between 1995 and 2000, the subsequent
reduction in κˆ highlights an increase in the underlying quality dispersion. There are several
moments of the sales distribution that help explain the observed movement in the parameters
of the model. For example, we find that the ratio of sales between exporters and non-
exporters gets larger48, differences in sales between firms at certain percentiles become larger,
skewness decreases (longer left tail), and average markups increase (as reported above).
This could reflect an expansion of the largest firms, or smaller firms at the bottom of the
distribution. We find that the former is more apparent in the sales data, and point to the
effect of trade in the industry analysis below.
The estimated restrictiveness of the standard gˆ is highly heterogeneous across industries.
Consider the reduction in the survival probability due to the standard, which is calculated
as (1 − gˆ−κˆ). Table 3 reports the reduced probability for each industry in 1995, 2000 and
2005. The most restrictive industries across the years – Motor Vehicles, Books/Journals,
Machinery and Other Metals, Pharmaceutical, and various food industries – averaged over
46In the appendix, Figure 11 displays the model and empirical sales distributions, which allows us to
visually compare the model and empirical sales distributions, which are reassuringly close.
47These are based on the De Loecker and Warzynski (2012) procedure and using material inputs as the
variable input. We take a weighted average using the firms’ share of total employment in the economy.
48This holds with average sales of firms above the median in domestic sales versus below the median,
which are reported in Table 2.
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Table 2: Estimation Results: Manufacturing-wide in 1995, 2000, and 2005
Panel A: Parameter Estimates
Year Data Targets gˆ κˆ γˆ
1995 Sales Percentiles (1-99) 1.1 (.01) 4.49 (.57) 1.92 (.15)
2000 Sales Percentiles (1-99) 1.13 (.01) 4.94 (.69) 2.40 (.18)
2005 Sales Percentiles (1-99) 1.02 (.004) 2.45 (.17) 1.30 (.06)
Panel B: Moments: Data versus Model
1995 2000 2005
Moment Data Model Data Model Data Model
Sales Advantage 2.41 2.42 2.57 2.59 2.88 2.87
90-10 Sales 3.89 3.88 4.15 4.15 4.71 4.65
99-90 Sales 2.02 2.04 2.25 2.28 2.26 2.35
Skewness .67 .69 0.78 .79 .43 .33
Average Markup 22% 14% 20% 12% 38% 31%
Panel A reports the parameter estimates when estimating the model for all manufacturing firms in each year (results also
available per industry, but are not reported as they would contain 40 estimates for each parameter per year). We compute
bootstrap standard errors (in parenthesis) by running the estimation 100 times, each time taking a bootstrap sample of
the data. In Panel B, we compute 5 moments in the data and using the simulated firms. “Sales Advantage” reflects the
log difference between the average sales of firms in the to 50% relative to the bottom 50%. “90-10” and “99-90” are log
differences in sales between firms in the respective percentiles. The average markup in the data is computed from estimating
markups using the De Loecker and Warzynski (2012) procedure and taking a weighted average using the firms’ share of total
employment in the economy.
50% lower survival probability. On the other hand, there are industries such as Apparel
and Furniture that hover around 10% in reduced probability across all years.49 On average,
the reduction in probability is 37% in 1995, 43% in 2000, and drops to 29% in 2005. This
is consistent with the previous results, where the restrictiveness at the economy wide-level
seems to decrease in 2005.
Robustness. The estimation above takes a general approach in terms of attempting to
match the whole sales distribution instead of specific moments within the distribution. As
a robustness check, we have applied a similar SMM procedure with specific moments from
the sales distribution that are pinned down by our parameters of interest. We construct 4
moments: i) the sales advantage of “high-quality” relative to “low-quality” firms50; ii) the
skewness of the distribution which captures the composition effect of the standard; and two
49In the analysis of time variation below, we eliminate “Other Publishing” and “Bakery” which have
massive decreases in restrictiveness. There are also a few industry-year pairs we drop from the table as the
estimated κˆ is imprecise.
50This moment is related to that used to identify the elasticity of substitution in Bernard et al. (2003).
Instead of comparing exporters and non-exporters, we compare firms above and below the median in sales.
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differences: iii) log(r˜)99 − log(r˜)90, and iv) log(r˜)90 − log(r˜)10.51 We plot the simulated sales
distribution in Appendix 6.4 and report the estimated parameters. We do not find large
discrepancies with our benchmark strategy: gˆ is very similar and has the same time series
patterns, as do the other two parameters. However, in the alternative calibration, the fit
with the data distribution is clearly not as close.
As an alternative approach, we consider fixing some parameters to estimate restrictive-
ness, with full results in Appendix 6.4. First, we set γ = 1 and estimate the remaining
two parameters, in case there is collinearity with the shape of the quality distribution. A
graphical analysis shows that this specification is not able to match the dispersion in sales in
the data. Moreover, the implied average markups, which are 39%, 46%, and 51%, are larger
than reasonable markup estimates. However, the time series pattern of gˆ uncovered in the
baseline estimation holds.52 Second, we estimate only the restrictiveness parameter, and set
κ = 4 and γ = 1.8 as deep parameters constant over time. Still, gˆ ranges between 1.04 and
1.1 with similar time-series movements.53
We also tie our model to the empirical exercise in Section 2. The industry-standards
parameter is interpreted slightly differently than TMit, but a rise in TMit should be reflected
in gˆit. As in the previous exercise, we fix κ and γ, but use the industry-year estimated
standards parameter to construct variation in (1 − gˆ−κ¯it ). As a link to (1), we regress firm
outcomes on an interaction of standards with the simulated quality draw (z). Firm quality
is held constant and we include the same fixed effects.54 Table 9 confirms that in fact,
as an industry experiences a reduction in survival probability, firms with a higher quality
draw have a relatively higher survival rate, and they raise their relative sales share and
markups. Therefore, our model generates results that are consistent with distributional
outcomes experienced in Chile in response to changes in the number of SPS regulations.
51We do not use moments from other distributions, such as markups and value added, because the data
does not allow us to differentiate between exported and domestic components.
52There is a shift downwards of κˆ and gˆ, as the restriction on the demand curvature requires a larger
dispersion in quality to match the dispersion in sales. The result supports the findings of Jung et al.
(2019), who estimate the Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) model and argue that linear demand predicts a sales
distribution with too little dispersion (given their preferred estimate of κ). A larger γ raises the sales of the
largest firms as demand is more elastic.
53As a further robustness check, we have estimated the addilog model of Bertoletti and Etro (2017) and
the linear, separable Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) model. The former is very similar to the IA case in our
GTP framework, while the latter is nested in our DA case with γ = 1. We found the results are almost
identical to those two estimations, and we make the results available upon request.
54We cannot compare the magnitude of the coefficients because our calibrated parameter, which we used
to estimate “reduction in survival probability”, is not comparable to the standards measure in the data.
This specification allows us to compare the signs, while holding “everything else constant” except gˆ (and the
aggregate competitiveness that follows).
28
4.3 Restrictiveness of Standards and Optimal Standard
We compare the estimated level of restrictiveness with the optimal standard predicted by
our model. We construct a restrictiveness index (RI) using the estimated parameters:
RIit =
gˆit
gˆoptit (κˆit, γˆit)
. (19)
where i denotes an industry, and t a year. The interpretation of this index is different from
the technical measures in Section 2, as it captures a wide variety of measures – for example
one that is meant to be protectionist in the guise of a quality standard – that limits the
survival of firms at the bottom of the sales distribution. We choose the IA model in a closed
economy as the benchmark because it yields the most conservative estimate of whether an
industry is too restrictive. We interpret goptIA as an upper bound for which policymakers can
view an industry as overly regulated. For each industry-year, we compute (19) and find that
there are several industries that appear too restrictive but that number has changed over
the years. As in the estimation for the universe of firms, the level of restrictiveness increases
from 1995 to 2000, but drops significantly in 2005.
Figure 3 plots the RI in 1995, 2000, and 2005 for each industry, sorted from largest to
smallest. For each industry-year, we derive the 95% confidence interval using the estimated
standard error for g in the calibration. We define industries with a confidence interval for RI
that includes a ratio of one or above as too restrictive. In 1995, 11 out of 38 industries are
too restrictive, although there are several industries that hover around 1.55 In 2000, there are
12 too-restrictive industries, though a similar number are clustered around an RI index of 1.
Therefore, even with the conservative measure of the optimal standard, 32% of industries are
within the confidence interval of being too restrictive. We take this as evidence that Chilean
manufacturing industries appear to be overly regulated – either through protectionism or
other types of regulations – at the start of the century. However, this restrictiveness drops
precipitously over the next few years. In 2005 only 5 out of 38 industries (13%) were overly
regulated, and many more industries drop far below the cutoff.56
Recall that the welfare-enhancing properties of standards are a reallocation to large
high-quality firms. For example, take the meat industry (ISIC 1511). The ratio of average
domestic sales of the top 50% of firms relative to the smallest 50% is 2.82 in 2000, and
increases to 3.44 in 2005 (reflected by the “Sales Advantage” in Panel B of Table 2). The
55The noise in the estimation can affect whether an industry fits within our definition of too restrictive.
However, this is only obvious in the “Other Manufacturing” and “Journals” industries.
56Plots that result from the estimation of DA preferences and assuming a fixed cost for the standard are
in the appendix – in both cases the optimal standard is merely shifted downwards.
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results suggest that the expansion of the large firms is concurrent with a lower estimated
restrictiveness of industries.
It is likely that a greater openness to trade contributed to the reallocation and is related to
drop in observed restrictiveness. Edmond et al. (2015) argue that trade reduces misallocation
through competition, and in fact we confirm that the standard in our paper works as a
complement to lower trade costs in an open economy setting (results available upon request).
In the appendix we report suggestive evidence. First, a plot of the total value of exports and
imports relative to GDP (Figure 18), suggests that the economy becomes more open after
2000. Furthermore, Chile signed free trade agreements with the EU in 2002, with the United
States and Korea in 2004, and with China in 2005. It also lowered its across-the-board tariffs
to 6% for all countries with which it did not have an agreement. In the bottom panel of
Figure 18, we plot average applied tariff rates (weighted by industry import flows) and the
terms of trade (provided by the World Development Indicators). Tariffs begin their decline
in 1999, dropping from 11% to 2% in 2007. There is a large terms of trade appreciation after
2001 – due to the price of copper – which creates opportunities for importers to enter the
Chilean market. Finally, there is a negative correlation between the changes in restrictiveness
and openness of the industry. In a plot of the log difference in RI between 2000 and 2005
against an openness measure, the correlation is -0.20 (Figure 19).
5 Conclusion
We have provided a policy that can improve allocative efficiency without relying on interna-
tional economic integration and merely affecting the selection of firms. An example of such
policy are product standards, which force low-quality firms out of the market and improve
welfare. In order to motivate the welfare-enhancing reallocation that occurs in the model,
we rely on a panel of Chilean manufacturing firms and compare the distribution of firm sales
across industries that differ in their level of regulation. Our findings that technical mea-
sures skew domestic sales towards high-quality firms complements the findings in the trade
literature that has found these measures to reduce the extensive margin of export flows.
We estimate the model to fit the observed distribution of domestic sales and conduct
a policy-relevant evaluation that compares the estimated level of restrictiveness with the
optimal standard as predicted by our model. Although industries appear heavily regulated
up until 2000, this is not the case in 2005 and there is suggestive evidence that it is driven
by more open industries.
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Table 3: Reduction in Probability of Survival Due to Restrictions by Industry-Year
ISIC Industry name 1995 2000 2005
1511 Meat 0.4 0.45 0.47
1512 Fish 0.16 0.38 0.2
1513 Fruit & Vegetables 0.35 0.33 0.13
1520 Dairy 0.32 0.22 0.3
1531 Grain Mill - 0.06 0.08
1549 Other Food 0.55 0.72 0.41
1552 Wine - 0.3 0.42
1554 Soft Drinks 0.12 0.33 0.1
1711 Textile Fibres 0.04 0.25 -
1721 Textile Articles - 0.49 0.13
1729 Other Textile 0 0 0.8
1730 Fabrics 0.59 0.57 0.25
1810 Apparel 0.12 0.15 0.02
1920 Footwear 0.32 0.61 0.17
2010 Sawmilling 0.06 0.38 0.14
2022 Carpentry 0.31 0.71 0.48
2102 Paper 0.23 0.35 0.31
2109 Other Paper 0.22 0.84 0
2211 Books 0.87 0.98 0.45
2212 Journals 0.71 0.81 0.45
2221 Printing 0.2 0.27 0
2411 Basic Chemicals 0.8 0.43 0.21
2422 Paints 0.09 0.49 0.22
2423 Pharmaceutical 0.48 0.42 -
2424 Detergents 0.75 0.65 0.11
2429 Other Chemicals 0.19 - -
2519 Other Rubber 0.79 0.78 0.58
2520 Plastic 0.37 0.26 0.19
2695 Concrete 0.5 0.26 -
2710 Iron and Steel 0.47 0.72 0.39
2720 Non-ferrous Metals 0.2 0.13 0.11
2811 Structural Metal 0.46 0.22 0.04
2899 Other Metal 0.49 0.48 0.48
2919 Other Machinery 0.62 0 0
2924 Machinery 0.43 0.53 -
3430 Motor Vehicles 0.6 0.61 0.56
3610 Furniture 0.15 0.13 0.03
3699 Other Manuf. 0.16 0.84 0.6
Average 0.37 0.43 0.29
This table reports the reduced probability of producing in each industry given the estimated restric-
tiveness of the industry. The probability is calculated as (1 − gˆ−κˆ). It is based on the simulated
method of moments estimation for year industry by year. For certain industry-year pairs, the data
was insufficient to estimate stable parameter values, which is why certain entries above are missing.
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Figure 3: Restrictiveness Index with IA Preferences: 1995, 2000, and 2005.
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In red are the industries where we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the restrictiveness index is different from one.
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6 Appendix
6.1 Database of Non-Tariff Measures
The database is available at https://i-tip.wto.org/goods/default.aspx?language=en. It is
also made available on the TRAINS database, but we downloaded the full set of measures
for all measures and all reporters from the WTO site. Then, we kept only the cases where
the “reporter” is Chile, the “partner” is the World, the starting year is within 1995-2007, and
the NTM chapter is either SPS (Chapter A), TBT (Chapter B), or pre-shipment inspections
(Chapter C). In the main analysis we use only SPS measures. Also, we drop classifications
A1 within the SPS standards, as these are most likely to include regulations that only affect
imported goods. Finally, the data is provided with a “Start Year” of the NTM. We use this
year as the year that the measure is imposed which allows for time variation in TMit (which
is a flow measure).
Notice that this is not the same data used in Fontagne´ et al. (2015). They are interested in
“specific trade concerns” (STCs), which are complaints to the WTO made by trade partners
about NTMs that are applied by the imposing country. Those NTMs are a subset of this
data, but we count every single SPS that is imposed by Chile, which is a much larger set of
measures than the ones with a reported STC. The drawback of course is that there is less
information about these measures, and what their real “purpose” is.
Once the data is cleaned so that there are only SPS measures, with Chile as the imposing
country and World as the partner, the most important step is how to create an industry
measure of regulation. There are many observations for the imposition of each measure for
two reasons. First, each regulation can affect multiple products. We do want to keep every
product affected. Second, each regulation is categorized with a specific code in terms of the
type of standard imposed. The standard code is one letter (chapter), plus 3 digits. Of the
3 digits, we use only the first digit. For example, if the same product in 2001 is affected by
a measure “A330” and “A310”, we count this as only one measure and delete duplicates.
We do this in order to not double count measures, as it seems likely that this is the same
measure categorized as two different types of SPS codes.
Finally, we aggregate the data to have an industry-year index of regulations. First, since
the firm data is at the 4-digit ISIC level, we concord the product-level (HS6) to the ISIC
level. Then, we aggregate to get a total number of measures imposed for each industry
in each year. To control for the number of products within an industry, the total number
of measures is divided by the number of HS6 products in that industry. This is therefore
calculated as what is called a Frequency Index in the trade literature.57 We construct a
Frequency Index in industry i which can be written as:
Fi =
∑
p∈iDpMp∑
p∈iMp
(20)
where Dp is equal to the number of unique 2-digit NTM codes imposed in product p, within
57A similar calculation could be done where we weight the products by their importance in production (a
Coverage Ratio). Since we are not attempting to measure the effect on aggregate flows, we do not believe
the coverage ratio is the correct measure for our purposes (although it would be trivial to construct).
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industry i. Mp is a dummy for a product produced within the industry. The trade literature
typically treats Mp as a dummy for a product being imported by a country. In our case, we
take into consideration all products within industry i.
6.2 Motivational Evidence
Table 4: Top 25 Most Regulated Industries
SPS and TBT Rank SPS Rank
Rank ISIC Industry Name ISIC Industry Name
1 2421 Pesticides 1511 Meat products
2 1520 Dairy products 1513 Fruit and vegetables
3 1531 Grain products 1513 Fruit and vegetables
4 1552 Wine 1549 Other Food
5 1511 Meat products 1520 Dairy products
6 1513 Fruit and vegetables 1512 Fish products
7 1551 Alcohol production 1531 Grain products
8 1554 Soft drinks 1532 Starch products
9 1532 Starch products 2429 Other Chemicals
10 1533 Animal feeds 1553 Beer
11 1549 Other Food 1542 Sugar
12 1512 Fish products 1711 Textiles
13 1514 Oils and fats 2423 Wood
14 2424 Cleaning products 2010 Domestic appliances
15 2010 Wood 1533 Animal Feeds
16 1544 Farinaceous products 1554 Soft drinks
17 1543 Candy bars 2029 Manufacture of other products of wood
18 2021 Plywood, etc 1543 Chocolate and Sugar Confectionery
19 3230 TV and radio receivers 2412 Fertilisers and Nitrogen Compounds
20 3150 Lighting equipment 1544 Farinaceous products
21 3190 Other electrical equipment 2021 Plywood, etc
22 2912 Pumps 2411 Basic Chemicals
23 3311 Medical equipment 1429 Other Mining
24 2423 Pharmaceuticals 1911 Tanning and Dressing of Leather
25 2023 Wooden containers 2320 Manufacture of refined petroleum products
This table ranks industries by frequency index. We count the total number of standards imposed over all
years (although in the regression we take the annual number of measures imposed). On the left we rank
industries using both SPS and TBT standards. On the right, we rank industries using only SPS standards.
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Table 5: Correlation of Quality with TFP (top) and Size (bottom) across Firms
Quality Proxy
log(K/L) log(W/L) log(M/L) log(K/L) log(W/L) log(M/L)
Log TFP 0.532∗∗∗ 0.436∗∗∗ 1.323∗∗∗
(0.110) (0.036) (0.068)
Log Labor Productivity 0.646∗∗∗ 0.349∗∗∗ 0.606∗∗∗
(0.030) (0.012) (0.030)
Fixed Effects Industry-Year Industry-Year Industry-Year Industry-Year Industry-Year Industry-Year
# Observations 63790 63785 63790 61779 65483 65441
Quality Proxy
(K/L) (W/L) (M/L)
Log Size 0.464∗∗∗ 0.227∗∗∗ 0.473∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.005) (0.014)
Fixed Effects Industry-Year Industry-Year Industry-Year
# Observations 64894 68864 67993
This table regresses the quality proxy on measures of productivity and size. The top table displays results for two different measures of
productivity: log TFP estimated from a Translog production function using the procedure outlined in Weinberger (2017), and a simple
measure of logged value added per worker. The bottom panel displays results for the relationship between quality and log sales. Quality is
proxied by (logged) capital per worker, total wages per worker, and input expenditure per worker respectively. In all specifications we use
the full panel of firm-year observations and include industry-year fixed effects so that we are only capturing within industry-year
relationships. Standard errors – clustered by 4-digit industry – are in parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
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Table 6: Firm Sales and Survival Heterogeneity: Effects of Technical Measures including TBT
Panel A: OLS
Log Domestic Sales Survival
(Sales) (K/L) (W/L) (M/L) (Sales) (K/L) (W/L) (M/L)
TM*Char 0.013∗∗ 0.015∗∗ 0.012∗∗ 0.008 0.016∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗ 0.009 0.006
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.004)
Openness*Char 0.022 0.965 0.144 -1.998∗∗ -0.525∗∗ -0.526∗∗∗ -0.406 -0.206
(1.294) (0.787) (1.094) (0.769) (0.249) (0.099) (0.271) (0.129)
Tariff*Char -0.010∗∗∗ -0.011∗∗∗ -0.012∗∗∗ -0.006 -0.003∗∗ -0.008∗∗∗ 0.000 -0.001
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Fixed Effects Firm, I-Y Firm, I-Y Firm, I-Y Firm, I-Y Firm, I-Y Firm, I-Y Firm, I-Y Firm, I-Y
R2 0.955 0.955 0.955 0.955 0.644 0.645 0.644 0.643
# Observations 44220 44220 44220 43789 69679 69679 69679 68924
Panel B: IV Results
Log Domestic Sales Survival
(IV-Sales) (IV-K/L) (IV-W/L) (IV-M/L) (IV-Sales) (IV-K/L) (IV-W/L) (IV-M/L)
TM*Char 0.028∗ 0.034∗∗ 0.046∗∗∗ 0.006 0.027∗∗ 0.002 0.031∗∗∗ 0.002
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Openness*Char 0.003 0.949 0.114 -1.995∗∗ -0.532∗∗∗ -0.520∗∗∗ -0.420∗∗∗ -0.204
(0.717) (0.831) (0.882) (0.825) (0.118) (0.113) (0.120) (0.161)
Tariff*Char -0.010∗∗∗ -0.011∗∗∗ -0.013∗∗∗ -0.006∗∗∗ -0.003∗∗∗ -0.008∗∗∗ 0.000 -0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
F-stat (first stage) 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
# Observations 44220 44220 44220 43789 69679 69679 69679 68924
Fixed Effects Firm, I-Y Firm, I-Y Firm, I-Y Firm, I-Y Firm, I-Y Firm, I-Y Firm, I-Y Firm, I-Y
In this table we conduct the specification displayed in (1), using technical measures imposed in Chile (top), and also instrumenting Chile’s
measures with Peru’s technical measures (bottom). Compared to the Table in the main text, here we construct the frequency index of
technical measures allowing technical measure to be SPS or TBT NTMs. We still drop those geared towards imports. The NTM measures
are aggregated to the 4 digit ISIC industry level. The total number of measures in each industry-year are summed and then divided by
the number of HS6 products in the industry. Each row interacts the TM measure with a dummy for above median in 1995 in terms of
sales and quality, where quality is proxied by capital per worker, total wages per worker, and input expenditure per worker respectively.
For the results on survival, all firms alive in 1995 are “potential” producers in all years, which is why the number of observations is
much larger. In all specifications we include an interaction of industry openness with the quality indicator, an interaction of the quality
indicator measure with the industry import tariff, plus firm and industry-year interacted fixed effects. Standard errors – clustered by
4-digit industry – are in parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
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Table 7: Firm Sales Heterogeneity - Repeated Cross-Sections
Panel A: OLS
Log Domestic Sales
(Sales) (K/L) (W/L) (M/L)
TM*Char 0.150∗∗∗ 0.113∗∗∗ 0.094∗∗∗ 0.139∗∗∗
(0.032) (0.030) (0.033) (0.032)
Openness*Char 4.833 3.236 3.557 1.640
(5.175) (2.533) (3.172) (2.913)
Tariff*Char 0.184∗∗∗ 0.090∗∗∗ 0.125∗∗∗ 0.113∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
DemandElast*Char -0.002 -0.010 -0.005 -0.016
(0.030) (0.027) (0.027) (0.025)
Fixed Effects I-Y I-Y I-Y I-Y
R2 0.589 0.364 0.415 0.406
# Observations 41557 41557 41557 41118
Panel B: IV Results
Log Domestic Sales
(IV-Sales) (IV-K/L) (IV-W/L) (IV-M/L)
TM*Char 0.095∗∗∗ 0.058∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗ 0.092∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Openness*Char 5.003∗∗∗ 3.398∗∗∗ 3.714∗∗∗ 1.804
(1.044) (0.888) (1.181) (1.123)
Tariff*Char 0.194∗∗∗ 0.099∗∗∗ 0.133∗∗∗ 0.121∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
DemandElast*Char 0.005∗∗∗ -0.002 0.003 -0.009∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
F-stat (first stage) 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
# Observations 41557 41557 41557 41118
Fixed Effects I-Y I-Y I-Y I-Y
This Table is a repeated cross-section analysis of specification (1). Regulations are aggregated by industry across
all years, so variation is only at the industry level. TMi (restrictiveness) is measured at the 4 digit ISIC industry
level. In this specification, we control for the firm indicator interacted with 3 different industry controls: openness,
average tariffs, and the industry demand elasticity (this is the only one not used in the benchmark specification,
since it is subsumed by firm fixed effects.) Each row interacts the TM measure with a dummy for above median in
1995 in terms of sales and quality, where quality is proxied by capital per worker, total wages per worker, and input
expenditure per worker respectively. For the results on survival, all firms alive in 1995 are “potential” producers
in all years, which is why the number of observations is much larger. In all specifications we include industry-
year interacted fixed effects. Standard errors – clustered by 4-digit industry – are in parentheses. ***p < 0.01,
**p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
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Table 8: Firm Sales and Survival Heterogeneity: Effects of Technical Measures that include only
Pre-Shipment Inspections and Prohibitions of Imports for SPS and TBT reasons
Panel A: OLS
Log Domestic Sales Survival
(Sales) (K/L) (W/L) (M/L) (Sales) (K/L) (W/L) (M/L)
TM*Char -0.013 0.042 -0.007 -0.019 -0.012 -0.004 -0.000 -0.019
(0.023) (0.026) (0.030) (0.019) (0.014) (0.012) (0.015) (0.015)
Openness*Char 0.037 0.980 0.154 -0.257 -0.516∗∗ -0.519∗∗∗ -0.401 -0.424∗∗
(1.290) (0.788) (1.096) (0.827) (0.246) (0.101) (0.269) (0.186)
Tariff*Char -0.010∗∗ -0.011∗∗∗ -0.012∗∗∗ -0.009∗∗ -0.003∗ -0.008∗∗∗ 0.000 -0.002
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Fixed Effects Firm, I-Y Firm, I-Y Firm, I-Y Firm, I-Y Firm, I-Y Firm, I-Y Firm, I-Y Firm, I-Y
R2 0.955 0.955 0.955 0.954 0.644 0.645 0.644 0.644
# Observations 44220 44220 44220 44220 69679 69679 69679 69679
Panel B: IV Results
Log Domestic Sales Survival
(IV-Sales) (IV-K/L) (IV-W/L) (IV-M/L) (IV-Sales) (IV-K/L) (IV-W/L) (IV-M/L)
TM*Char -1.325 -0.453 -2.227 1.795 -0.511 2.284 -3.422 -1.770
(1.664) (1.673) (1.759) (1.685) (2.454) (3.079) (3.726) (2.815)
Openness*Char -0.041 0.946 0.017 -0.142 -0.540∗∗∗ -0.410∗∗ -0.565∗∗∗ -0.508∗∗∗
(0.723) (0.833) (0.888) (0.902) (0.163) (0.187) (0.214) (0.176)
Tariff*Char -0.014∗∗∗ -0.013∗∗ -0.019∗∗∗ -0.003 -0.005 -0.001 -0.010 -0.007
(0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.010) (0.012) (0.009)
F-stat (first stage) 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
# Observations 44220 44220 44220 44220 69679 69679 69679 69679
Fixed Effects Firm, I-Y Firm, I-Y Firm, I-Y Firm, I-Y Firm, I-Y Firm, I-Y Firm, I-Y Firm, I-Y
In this table we conduct the specification displayed in (1), using technical measures imposed in Chile (top), and also instrumenting Chile’s
measures with Peru’s technical measures (bottom). Compared to the Table in the main text, here we construct the frequency index of
technical measures allowing technical measure to be only pre-shipment inspections plus the NTM codes with SPS and TBT that seem
more likely to apply to importers (A1 and B1). The NTM measures are aggregated to the 4 digit ISIC industry level. The total number of
measures in each industry-year are summed and then divided by the number of HS6 products in the industry. Each row interacts the TM
measure with a dummy for above median in 1995 in terms of sales and quality, where quality is proxied by capital per worker, total wages
per worker, and input expenditure per worker respectively. For the results on survival, all firms alive in 1995 are “potential” producers
in all years, which is why the number of observations is much larger. In all specifications we include an interaction of industry openness
with the quality indicator, an interaction of the quality indicator measure with the industry import tariff, plus firm and industry-year
interacted fixed effects. Standard errors – clustered by 4-digit industry – are in parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
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6.3 Model’s Derivations
6.3.1 Consumers’ Problem
Recall the Generalized Translated Power (GTP) preferences:
U =
∫
Ω
(
azξq(ω)− (ξq(ω))
1+ 1
γ
1 + 1
γ
)
dω +
ξ−η − 1
η
(21)
where ξ is a quantity aggregator that is implicitly defined as:
ξ−η =
∫ (
azξq(ω)− (ξq(ω))1+ 1γ
)
dω (22)
The first order conditions of the consumers’ problem are:
azξ − ξ1+ 1γ q(ω) 1γ +

∫ (
azq(ω)− ξ 1γ (q(ω))1+ 1γ
)
dω − ξ−η−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0 by (22)
 ∂ξ∂q(ω) = λp(ω)
azξ − ξ1+ 1γ q(ω) 1γ = λp(ω) (23)
By multyplying both sides of (23) by q(ω) and integrating across all varieties ω ∈ Ω, we
obtain the marginal utility of income λ.
λ =
1
y
∫ (
azξq(ω)− (ξq(ω))1+ 1γ
)
dω =
ξ−η
y
(24)
Using (24) in (23) yields the inverse demand:
p(ω) =
ξ
λ
[
az(ω)− (ξq(ω)) 1γ
]
= yξ1+η
[
az − (ξq(ω)) 1γ
]
(25)
As we consider a closed economy, we normalize per capita income to unity.
6.3.2 Quality Standard and Aggregate Variables
The average profits of firms with z > z¯ are:
p¯i =
∫ ∞
z¯
pi(z)
κz¯κ
zκ+1
dz =
=
Lc
1 + γ
(
aγ
1 + γ
)γ
(z∗)γ
ξ
∫ ∞
z¯
( z
z∗
− 1
)1+γ κz¯κ
zκ+1
dz =
=
Lc
1 + γ
(
aγ
1 + γ
)γ
(z∗)γ
ξ
G1(g) (26)
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where G1(g) is a function of κ, γ, and of the restrictiveness of the standard g:
G1(g) =
∫ ∞
z¯
κ
( z
z∗
− 1
)1+γ z¯κ
zκ+1
dz =
=
∫ ∞
z¯
κ
(
1− z
∗
z
)1+γ
z¯κ
(z∗)1+γzκ−γ
dz =
= κg1+γ
[
F1(g)
κ− γ − 1 − g
−1F2(g)
κ− γ
]
(27)
F1(g) and F2(g) are two hypergeometric functions given by:
F1(g) = 2F1
[
κ− γ − 1,−γ;κ− γ, g−1]
F2(g) = 2F1
[
κ− γ,−γ;κ− γ + 1, g−1] .
The probability of a firm being active is:
P (z ≥ z¯) = b
κ
z¯κ
=
bκ
(z∗g)κ
(28)
The zero expected profit condition is:
P (z ≥ z¯)p¯i = fE
Lc
1 + γ
(
aγ
1 + γ
)γ
bκ
(z∗)κ−γgκξ
G1(g) = fE (29)
from which we obtain:
(z∗)κ−γξ =
Lcbκ
fE(1 + γ)
(
aγ
1 + γ
)γ
g−κG1(g) (30)
Substituting the quality cutoff z∗ = c
a
ξ−(1+η) into (30) yields the quality cutoff z∗ and market
aggregator ξ as a function of g and model’s parameters:
z∗ =
[
Lc
η
1+η γγbκaγ+
1
1+η
fE(1 + γ)1+γ
g−κG1(g)
] 1
κ−γ− 11+η
(31)
ξ =
[
Lbκaκγγ
fE(1 + γ)1+γcκ−γ−1
g−κG1(g)
]− 1
(1+η)(κ−γ)−1
(32)
Firms’ average revenues are:
r¯ =
∫ ∞
z¯
r(z)κ
z¯κ
zκ+1
dz =
Lc
1 + γ
(
aγ
1 + γ
)γ
(z∗)γ
ξ
G2(g) (33)
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where G2(g) is a function of κ, γ, and g:
G2(g) =
∫ ∞
z¯
κ
( z
z∗
− 1
)γ ( z
z∗
+ γ
) z¯κ
zκ+1
dz =
=
∫ ∞
z¯
κ
(
1− z
∗
z
)γ (
1 + γ
z∗
z
)
z¯κ
(z∗)1+γzκ−γ
dz =
= κg1+γ
[
F1(g)
κ− γ − 1 + γg
−1F2(g)
κ− γ
]
(34)
Revenues normalized by average revenues, which we use in the calibration exercise, become:
r(z)
r¯
= (G2(g))
−1
( z
z∗
− 1
)γ ( z
z∗
+ γ
)
(35)
By market clearing:
c
1 + γ
(
aγ
1 + γ
)γ
Jbκ
(z∗)κ−γgκξ
G2(g) = 1 (36)
Dividing (36) by (29) yields the equilibrium mass of entrants, which is independent of η:
J =
L
fE
G1(g)
G2(g)
As shown in figure 4, market entry J is increasing in the restrictiveness of the standard.
Figure 4: Effects of a Standard on Entry
6.3.3 Welfare
To derive the utility, we need to derive the two integrals in (21) and (22). First, we obtain:∫ ∞
z¯
aξzq(z) = a
(
aγ
1 + γ
)γ
Jbκ
(z∗)κ−γgκ
z∗G3(g) (37)
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where G3(g) is given by:
G3(g) =
∫ ∞
z¯
κ
z
z∗
( z
z∗
− 1
)γ z¯κ
zκ+1
dz =
=
∫ ∞
z¯
κ
(
1− z
∗
z
)γ
z¯κ
(z∗)1+γzκ−γ
dz =
= κg1+γ
[
F1(g)
κ− γ − 1
]
(38)
Rearranging the market clearing condition,(
aγ
1 + γ
)γ
Jbκ
(z∗)κ−γgκξ
=
(1 + γ)ξ
cG2(g)
(39)
Using (39) into (37) yields: ∫ ∞
z¯
aξzq(z) = (1 + γ)
az∗ξ
c
(
G3(g)
G2(g)
)
(40)
Following the same steps, we obtain the second integral:∫ ∞
z¯
(ξq(z))1+
1
γ =
(
aγ
1 + γ
)1+γ
Jbκ
(z∗)κ−γgκ
z∗G1(g)
=
az∗ξ
c
γ
(
G1(g)
G2(g)
)
(41)
Substituting (40) and (41) into the utility function 21 yields:
U =
∫
Ω
(
azξq(ω)− (ξq(ω))
1+ 1
γ
1 + 1
γ
)
dω +
ξ−η − 1
η
=
az∗ξ
c
[
(1 + γ)
G3(g)
G2(g)
− γ
2
1 + γ
G1(g)
G2(g)
]
+
ξ−η − 1
η
By the cutoff condition (6), ξ−η = aξz
∗
c
. Thus, the utility becomes:
U =
az∗ξ
c
[
(1 + γ)
G3(g)
G2(g)
− γ
2
1 + γ
G1(g)
G2(g)
+
1
η
]
− 1
η
Finally, by the cutoff condition, z∗ = c
a
ξ−1−η. Thus, the utility becomes:
U = ξ−η
[
(1 + γ)
G3(g)
G2(g)
− γ
2
1 + γ
G1(g)
G2(g)
+
1
η
]
− 1
η
(42)
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Substituting (32) into (42) yields:
U =
[
Lbκaκγγ
fE(1 + γ)1+γcκ−γ−1
g−κG1(g)
] η
(1+η)(κ−γ)−1
[
(1 + γ)
G3(g)
G2(g)
− γ
2
1 + γ
G1(g)
G2(g)
+
1
η
]
− 1
η
(43)
The government chooses z¯. The equilibrium value of z∗(g) is determined by the equation
that describes the cutoff as a function of z∗(g). The measure of the restrictiveness of the
standard as the ratio between z¯ and the market cutoff under no restriction z∗(1) is given by:
g˜ =
z¯
z∗(1)
=
z¯
z∗(g)
z∗(g)
z∗(1)
= g
[
g−κG1(g)
G1(1)
] 1
κ−γ− 11+η
(44)
and exactly equals g under IA preferences η = −1.
Directly Additive Preferences
The case of DA preferences is obtained by setting η → ∞. The utility, market cutoff, and
aggregator become:
UDA =
[
Lbκaκγγ
fE(1 + γ)1+γcκ−γ−1
g−κG1(g)
] 1
κ−γ
[
(1 + γ)
G3(g)
G2(g)
− γ
2
1 + γ
G1(g)
G2(g)
]
(45)
z∗DA(g) =
[
Lcγγbκaγ
fE(1 + γ)1+γ
g−κG1(g)
] 1
κ−γ
(46)
ξDA = 1 (47)
Indirectly Additive Preferences
The case of IA preferences is obtained by setting η = −1. The utility becomes:
UIA =
[
Lbκaκγγ
fE(1 + γ)1+γcκ−γ−1
g−κG1(g)
] [
(1 + γ)
G3(g)
G2(g)
− γ
2
1 + γ
G1(g)
G2(g)
− 1
]
+ 1 (48)
z∗IA =
c
a
(49)
ξIA =
Lbκaκγγ
fE(1 + γ)1+γcκ−γ−1
g−κG1(g) (50)
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Homothetic Preferences
The case of homothetic preferences is obtained by setting η = 0. The market determined
cutoff and aggregator become:
z∗H =
[
Lγγbκaγ+1
fE(1 + γ)1+γ
g−κG1(g)
] 1
κ−γ−1
(51)
ξH =
[
Lbκaκγγ
fE(1 + γ)1+γ
g−κG1(g)cκ−γ−1
]− 1
κ−γ−1
(52)
The utility becomes:
UH = lim
η→0
{(
az∗
c
) η
1+η
[
(1 + γ)
G3(g)
G2(g)
− γ
2
1 + γ
G1(g)
G2(g)
]
+
(
az∗
c
) η
1+η − 1
η
}
=
=
[
(1 + γ)
G3(g)
G2(g)
− γ
2
1 + γ
G1(g)
G2(g)
]
+ ln
(
az∗
c
)
=
=
ln
[
Lγγbκaγ+1
fE(1+γ)1+γ
]
κ− γ − 1 + ln
(a
c
)
+ (1 + γ)
G3(g)
G2(g)
− γ
2
1 + γ
G1(g)
G2(g)
− κ ln g
κ− γ − 1 +
lnG1(g)
κ− γ − 1
(53)
Figure 5 shows the hump-shaped relationship between the utility of the consumers and
the restrictiveness of the standard g. Figure 6 presents the negative relationship between
the mass of active firms N and the standard g. Figure 7 presents the negative relationship
between the market determined quality cutoff z∗ and the standard g, under DA and homo-
thetic preferences, since under IA, the cutoff is a constant. Finally, figure 8 presents the
relationship between the aggregator ξ and the standard g, under IA and homothetic pref-
erences, since under DA, the aggregator equals one. The standard reduces the aggregator
under IA preferences while it increases the aggregator under homothetic preferences.
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Figure 5: Effects of a Standard on Welfare
(a) Directly Additive (b) Directly Additive
(c) Indirectly Additive (d) Indirectly Additive
(e) Homothetic (f) Homothetic
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Figure 6: Effects of a Standard on the Mass of Active Firms N
(a) Directly Additive (b) Directly Additive
(c) Indirectly Additive (d) Indirectly Additive
(e) Homothetic (f) Homothetic
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Figure 7: Effects of a Standard on the Market Quality Cutoff z∗
(a) Directly Additive (b) Directly Additive
(c) Homothetic (d) Homothetic
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Figure 8: Effects of a Standard on the Aggregator ξ
(a) Indirectly Additive (b) Indirectly Additive
(c) Homothetic (d) Homothetic
6.3.4 Fixed Cost
This section briefly outlines the case in which the government imposes a quality standard
in the market z¯, through a fixed cost of production f . The fixed cost f rationalizes the
compliance costs that firms must incur due to the standard, or the costs associated with
inspections for quality levels. The presence of a fixed cost f leaves the solution to the firms’
problem (quantities and prices) and, thus, the revenues, unchanged. However, the profits of
a firm with quality z become:
pi(z) =
Lc
1 + γ
(
aγ
1 + γ
)γ
(z∗)γ
ξ
( z
z∗
− 1
)1+γ
− f
There exists a firm with quality z¯, such that pi(z¯) = 0. The mapping between the fixed cost
f and the cutoff-firm z¯, equivalent to the quality standard imposed in the baseline model,
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is:
Lc
1 + γ
(
aγ
1 + γ
)γ
(z∗)γ
ξ
( z¯
z∗
− 1
)1+γ
= f
Lc
1 + γ
(
aγ
1 + γ
)γ
(z∗)γ
ξ
(g − 1)1+γ = f (54)
Using (54), average profits become:
p¯i =
Lc
1 + γ
(
aγ
1 + γ
)γ
(z∗)γ
ξ
G1(g)− f
=
Lc
1 + γ
(
aγ
1 + γ
)γ
(z∗)γ
ξ
(G1(g)− (g − 1)1+γ)
The zero expected profit condition is then
Lc
1 + γ
(
aγ
1 + γ
)γ
bκ
(z∗)κ−γgκξ
(G1(g)− (g − 1)1+γ) = fE
Relative to the baseline model, the fixed cost affects both z∗ and ξ. Using the market quality
cutoff condition z∗ = c
a
ξ−(1+η) into the zero expected profit condition yields the solutions for
z∗ and ξ. The fixed cost affect the utility of the representative consumer (42) only through
ξ. Following the same steps of the baseline model, the utility becomes:
U =
[
Lbκaκcκ−γ−1γγ
fE(1 + γ)1+γ
g−κ(G1(g)− (g − 1)1+γ)
] η
(1+η)(κ−γ)−1
[
(1 + γ)
G3(g)
G2(g)
− γ
2
1 + γ
G1(g)
G2(g)
+
1
η
]
− 1
η
and deriving the closed form expressions for the IA, DA, and homothetic case follows from
the baseline model. In particular,
UDA =
[
Lbκaκcκ−γ−1γγ
fE(1 + γ)1+γ
g−κ(G1(g)− (g − 1)1+γ)
] 1
κ−γ
[
(1 + γ)
G3(g)
G2(g)
− γ
2
1 + γ
G1(g)
G2(g)
]
UIA =
[
Lbκaκcκ−γ−1γγ
fE(1 + γ)1+γ
g−κ(G1(g)− (g − 1)1+γ)
] [
(1 + γ)
G3(g)
G2(g)
− γ
2
1 + γ
G1(g)
G2(g)
− 1
]
+ 1
UH =
ln
[
Lγγbκaγ+1
fE(1+γ)1+γ
]
κ− γ − 1 + ln
(a
c
)
+ (1 + γ)
G3(g)
G2(g)
− γ
2
1 + γ
G1(g)
G2(g)
− κ ln g
κ− γ − 1 +
ln(G1(g)− (g − 1)1+γ)
κ− γ − 1
While the standard in the baseline model directly affect the selection of firms, the fixed
cost also reallocates resources from production to the activities required to comply to the
regulation. As a result, the welfare benefits of the standard examined in the baseline case
are diminished by the fixed cost. In fact, the optimal standard is smaller in this extension
that it is in the baseline case: the fixed cost acts as a downward shift in the optimal g across
preferences. As shown in figure 9, for the DA and homothetic case the optimal policy is no
standard under certain parameters.
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Figure 9: Optimal g Across Preferences - Standard as Fixed Cost
(a) As a function of γ (b) As a function of κ
6.3.5 Productivity Heterogeneity and Quality
The baseline model features the simplifying assumption that firms differ exogenously in
terms of quality. However, most papers in the literature model firms that differ in terms
of productivity and that product quality is a function of firm’s productivity (Manova and
Zhang, 2017; Feenstra and Weinstein, 2016). This section shows that the results of our
baseline model also arise in a model in which quality is a function of firm’s productivity.
Consider an extension to the baseline model in which firms differ in terms of productivity
φ. As it is common in the literature, we assume that φ follows a Pareto distribution with
CDF: 1 −
(
b˜
φ
)κ˜
. Similarly to the framework of Manova and Zhang (2017), firm’s quality
is proportional to firm’s productivity: z = φ
1
θ , with θ > 0. Moreover, we let the marginal
cost of the firm φ be proportional to the quality. In particular, marginal costs are equal
to czβ. We assume that the elasticity of marginal costs with respect to quality is less than
one: β < 1. This assumption is made for average revenues to be well defined.58 To obtain a
closed form expression for the utility, we restrict the analysis to the linear GTP case, namely
γ = 1.
Firm’s profits become
pi(z) = Lξ1+η
[
azq(z)− ξ(q(z))2]− Lczβq(ω)
Profit maximization yields the following optimal quantity:
q(z) =
(a
2
) z∗
ξ
(
z
z∗
−
( z
z∗
)β)
58Modeling an endogenous quality choice as (Gaigne and Larue, 2016), in which firms must also pay a
fixed cost is highly untractable under GTP preferences. We verified that such a technological assumption
does not generate additional distortions in a model with standard CES preferences.
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where the market determined quality cutoff equals:
z∗ =
(
c
aξ1+η
) 1
1−β
Using the quality cutoff, we can rewrite the performance variables of the firm as follows:
p(z) =
c(z∗)β
2
(
z
z∗
+
( z
z∗
)β)
r(z) =
Lca
4
(z∗)β+1
ξ
(( z
z∗
)2
−
( z
z∗
)2β)
pi(z) =
Lca
4
(z∗)β+1
ξ
(
z
z∗
−
( z
z∗
)β)2
Let us derive the probability distribution for quality. In particular,
Pr(z˜ ≤ z) = Pr(φ 1θ ≤ z) = 1−
(
b˜
zθ
)κ˜
Thus, we can change the notation and derive the same distribution for quality we used in
the baseline model. In fact, quality z follows a Pareto distribution with shape parameter
κ = κ˜θ and shift parameter b = b˜
1
θ .
Following the same procedure as the baseline model, the utility of the representative
consumer becomes:
U =
[
Lbκaκ−2β
4fEcκ−2
g−κG1(g)
] η(1−β)
(1+η)(κ−1)−1−βη [
2
G3(g)
G2(g)
− 1
2
G1(g)
G2(g)
+
1
η
]
− 1
η
where
G1(g) =
κg2
κ− 2 −
2κgβ+1
κ− β − 1 +
κg2β
κ− 2β
G2(g) =
κg2
κ− 2 −
κg2β
κ− 2β
G3(g) =
κg2
κ− 2 −
κgβ+1
κ− β − 1
Figure 10 shows the relationship between welfare and the restrictiveness of the standard for
different values of β, under IA preferences. For β = 0, this extension becomes identical to
the baseline model. This implies that our baseline model with firms heterogeneous in quality
is equivalent to a model in which firms differ in terms of productivity, and their productivity
is proportional to their product quality. The result is independent of the level of θ, as long
as the two models match the same distribution of sales.
For β 6= 0, the marginal costs of production depends on quality. If β < 0, firm’s with
high quality also have lower production costs. This scenario assumes that more productive
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firms have higher quality and attain cost efficiency. When β < 0, the sales difference between
low-quality firms and high-quality firms increases relative to the baseline model, since high-
quality firms are also low-cost firms. In this case, the business stealing bias is reduced relative
to the baseline model. Hence, the optimal level of g is smaller.
On the other hand, β > 0 yields the more realistic scenario in which high-quality firms
have higher costs of production than low-quality firms (Manova and Zhang, 2017). In this
scenario, the business stealing bias is larger than the baseline case. There are too many
low-quality firms operating in the market because 1) their markups are lower and 2) their
marginal costs are lower. As a result, when marginal costs and quality are positively corre-
lated the positive welfare effects of the standard are larger. The result also arises under DA
and homothetic preferences. Details are available upon request.
Figure 10: Minimum Quality Standard and Welfare (η = −1)
6.4 Estimation
Figure 11 displays the results for the benchmark manufacturing-wide estimation for each
year. We show results for the years 1995, 2000, 2005. Figure 12 displays the result under
the alternative calibration in which we target only 4 moments: the sales advantage of “high-
quality” relative to “low-quality” firms; the skewness of the distribution; and two differences:
log(r˜)99 − log(r˜)90 and log(r˜)90 − log(r˜)10. Figure 13 plots the simulated sales distribution
with a fixed linear demand: γ = 1. Figure 14 plots the simulated sales distribution when we
set κ = 4 and γ = 1.8.
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Figure 11: Log Domestic Sales Distribution: Model VS Data
Each figure plots the CDF of the log sales distribution in the data (red) versus the simulated distribution given the
estimated parameters. The model is estimated using the universe of manufacturing firms in each year. Although we
estimate parameters for all years, we report only 1995, 2000, and 2005. The 95% confidence intervals for the param-
eters in each of the three years are: gˆ = (1.08, 1.11), (1.1, 1.15), (1.01, 1.03); κˆ = (3.37, 5.6), (3.59, 6.29), (2.12, 2.78);
γˆ = (1.63, 2.21), (2.04, 2.75), (1.17, 1.42).
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Figure 13: Log Domestic Sales Distribution: Model (γ = 1) VS Data
Each figure plots the CDF of the log sales distribution in the data (red) versus the simulated distribution given the estimated
parameters. The parameters of the model are estimated using the main specification, but a fixed γ = 1. The model is
estimated using the universe of manufacturing firms in each year. The 95% confidence intervals for the parameters in each
of the three years are: gˆ = (1.02, 1.04), (1.02, 1.03), (1.00, 1.02); κˆ = (0.94, 2.51), (1.26, 2.29), (2, 2).
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Figure 14: Log Domestic Sales Distribution: Model (γ = 1.8, κ = 4) VS Data
Each figure plots the CDF of the log sales distribution in the data (red) versus the simulated distribution given the estimated
parameters. The parameters of the model are estimated using the main specification, but a fixed γ = 1.8 and κ = 4. The
model is estimated using the universe of manufacturing firms in each year. The 95% confidence intervals for the parameters
in each of the three years are: gˆ = (1.09, 1.1), (1.07, 1.08), (1.04, 1.05).
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Table 9: Firm Heterogeneity as a Response to Restrictiveness: Simulated Data
Survival Relative Sales Log Markup
(1) (2) (3)
gˆ*Quality 2.549∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.002∗
(0.437) (0.000) (0.001)
Fixed Effects Firm, I-Y Firm, I-Y Firm, I-Y
# Observations 120000 106406 106406
This table regresses simulated firm outcomes on the interaction of the calibrated standards parameter and the
firm quality draw. We simulate 1000 firms per industry in 1995, 2000, and 2005 using κ = 4, γ = 1, and the
estimated gˆit. In all, 40,000 firms are simulated across 40 industries. The restrictiveness parameter is allowed to
vary across time, but firm quality draws and other parameters are held fixed. We re-simulate the economy in each
year and produce 3 firm outcomes: (i) a survival dummy (column 1), (ii) firm sales (relative to total industry
sales) (column 2), and (iii) the firm log markup (column 3). In the first specification we use the full panel of
firm-year simulations, where survival is equal to one if the firm produces given the estimated z¯it. In the latter
two specifications we include all producing firms. As in (1), each specification includes firm and industry-year
fixed effects so that we are only capturing within industry-year distributions. Standard errors – clustered by
4-digit industry – are in parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
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Figure 12: Log Domestic Sales Distribution: Model (Alternative Calibration) VS Data
Each Figure plots the CDF of the log sales distribution in the data (red) versus the simulated distribution given the estimated
parameters. The parameters of the model are estimated using only the 4 moments described in the “alternative calibration”.
The model is estimated using the universe of manufacturing firms in each year. The 95% confidence intervals for the
parameters in each of the three years are: gˆ = (1.05, 1.11), (1.08, 1.14), (1.03, 1.06); κˆ = (0.94, 8.23), (1.26, 8), (2.08, 4.6);
γˆ = (1.11, 2.50), (1.42, 2.87), (1.27, 2.06).
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Figure 15: Restrictiveness Index in IA with γ = 1 Model: 1995, 2000, and 2005.
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In red are the industries where we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the restrictiveness index is different from one.
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Figure 16: Restrictiveness Index in DA with general γ Model: 1995, 2000, and 2005.
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In red are the industries where we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the restrictiveness index is different from one.
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Figure 17: Restrictiveness Index in IA with Fixed Costs: 1995, 2000, and 2005.
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In red are the industries where we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the restrictiveness index is different from one.
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Figure 18: Chilean Trade Flows, Tariffs, Terms of Trade
66
Figure 19: Industry Openness vs Log Difference in Industry Restrictiveness (2000 to 2005)
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This figure plots Industry Openness versus the log change in the restrictiveness index between 2000 and 2005.
Openness (x-axis) is defined as the sum of imports and exports over total sales. The y-axis is the log change
in the restrictiveness index between 2000 and 2005. There are a total of 34 industries in the plot, as we drop
industries with openness above a ratio of 4. The result is robust to allowing for industries with an even larger
ratio, but we believe a cutoff is necessary because, for example, the “Other Manufacturing” industry has an
openness ratio more than 60 times larger than the median industry. The slope of the best fit line is -.2.
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